Career concerns, contracts, and effort distortions
(2002) In Journal Labor Economics 20(1). p.42-58- Abstract
- A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/893759
- author
- Andersson, Fredrik LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2002
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Journal Labor Economics
- volume
- 20
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 42 - 58
- publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000173879600003
- scopus:0036116632
- ISSN
- 1537-5307
- DOI
- 10.1086/323931
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 531fcce5-5ebb-42cf-a82b-1ff5f208aeca (old id 893759)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 12:27:59
- date last changed
- 2024-01-08 21:28:40
@article{531fcce5-5ebb-42cf-a82b-1ff5f208aeca, abstract = {{A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.}}, author = {{Andersson, Fredrik}}, issn = {{1537-5307}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{42--58}}, publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}}, series = {{Journal Labor Economics}}, title = {{Career concerns, contracts, and effort distortions}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/323931}}, doi = {{10.1086/323931}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2002}}, }