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Career concerns, contracts, and effort distortions

Andersson, Fredrik LU (2002) In Journal Labor Economics 20(1). p.42-58
Abstract
A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Journal Labor Economics
volume
20
issue
1
pages
42 - 58
publisher
University of Chicago Press
external identifiers
  • wos:000173879600003
  • scopus:0036116632
ISSN
1537-5307
DOI
10.1086/323931
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
531fcce5-5ebb-42cf-a82b-1ff5f208aeca (old id 893759)
date added to LUP
2008-01-15 14:35:18
date last changed
2017-03-26 03:41:24
@article{531fcce5-5ebb-42cf-a82b-1ff5f208aeca,
  abstract     = {A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.},
  author       = {Andersson, Fredrik},
  issn         = {1537-5307},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {42--58},
  publisher    = {University of Chicago Press},
  series       = {Journal Labor Economics},
  title        = {Career concerns, contracts, and effort distortions},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/323931},
  volume       = {20},
  year         = {2002},
}