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Accounting for Context : Separating Monetary and (Uncertain) Social Incentives

Bergh, Andreas LU and Wichardt, Philipp C. LU (2018) In Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 72. p.61-66
Abstract
This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a way that explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects and allows for uncertainty also about the latter. Moreover, it allows non-economic cost associated with the deviation from some norm to be more discriminatory than just “right” or “wrong.” We refer to existing evidence on dictator game giving to demonstrate how intermediate behaviours (giving some) as well as payments to change the context (e.g. exiting the game) can be accounted for. Furthermore, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results... (More)
This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a way that explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects and allows for uncertainty also about the latter. Moreover, it allows non-economic cost associated with the deviation from some norm to be more discriminatory than just “right” or “wrong.” We refer to existing evidence on dictator game giving to demonstrate how intermediate behaviours (giving some) as well as payments to change the context (e.g. exiting the game) can be accounted for. Furthermore, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results of a classroom experiment suggest that women are more responsive to such contextual effects. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
social norms, experimental economics, game theory, context effects, efficiency, social preferences, utility, D03, D63, Z10
in
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
volume
72
pages
61 - 66
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • scopus:85037027565
ISSN
2214-8043
DOI
10.1016/j.socec.2017.11.002
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
8c180bcc-49ff-4957-8e54-cdb651f07582
date added to LUP
2017-11-13 21:07:48
date last changed
2018-05-29 09:58:10
@article{8c180bcc-49ff-4957-8e54-cdb651f07582,
  abstract     = {This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a way that explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects and allows for uncertainty also about the latter. Moreover, it allows non-economic cost associated with the deviation from some norm to be more discriminatory than just “right” or “wrong.” We refer to existing evidence on dictator game giving to demonstrate how intermediate behaviours (giving some) as well as payments to change the context (e.g. exiting the game) can be accounted for. Furthermore, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results of a classroom experiment suggest that women are more responsive to such contextual effects.},
  author       = {Bergh, Andreas and Wichardt, Philipp C.},
  issn         = {2214-8043},
  keyword      = {social norms,experimental economics,game theory,context effects,efficiency,social preferences,utility,D03,D63,Z10},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {61--66},
  publisher    = {Elsevier},
  series       = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
  title        = {Accounting for Context : Separating Monetary and (Uncertain) Social Incentives},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2017.11.002},
  volume       = {72},
  year         = {2018},
}