Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies
Bäck, Hanna LU
; Debus, Marc
and Dumont, Patrick
(2011)
In European Journal of Political Research
50.
p.441-478
- Abstract
- Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and
why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the
literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain... (More) - Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and
why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the
literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an
important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/2344044
- author
- Bäck, Hanna
LU
; Debus, Marc
and Dumont, Patrick
- publishing date
- 2011
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- European Journal of Political Research
- volume
- 50
- pages
- 441 - 478
- publisher
- Wiley
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:79955006051
- ISSN
- 0304-4130
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 8ebfbe24-f785-4e2e-a0cf-1d103df9fc0d (old id 2344044)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 14:17:43
- date last changed
- 2024-02-29 06:41:52
@article{8ebfbe24-f785-4e2e-a0cf-1d103df9fc0d,
abstract = {{Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and<br/><br>
why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the<br/><br>
literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an<br/><br>
important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies.}},
author = {{Bäck, Hanna and Debus, Marc and Dumont, Patrick}},
issn = {{0304-4130}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{441--478}},
publisher = {{Wiley}},
series = {{European Journal of Political Research}},
title = {{Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies}},
volume = {{50}},
year = {{2011}},
}