Solving the Decider’s Dilemma: Scapegoats, Foreign Affairs, and the Duration of Interstate War
(2017) In STANCE Working Papers Series 2017(11). p.1-26- Abstract
- The prospects of domestic punishment might compel leaders responsible for the initiation of the war to continue fighting until they achieve favorable war outcomes (Croco 2011, 2015). As applied to war duration, this logic implies that ‘culpable’ leaders do not have incentives to end a war that will bring defeat. This paper argues that leaders can escape this dilemma by blaming and replacing their cabinet ministers for poor war results. Under a framework of war as a bargaining process, and using a database of the tenure of thousands of ministers of foreign affairs, this paper shows that the replacement of these cabinet ministers reduces the duration of interstate wars that end in defeat. These findings suggest that leaders do not... (More)
- The prospects of domestic punishment might compel leaders responsible for the initiation of the war to continue fighting until they achieve favorable war outcomes (Croco 2011, 2015). As applied to war duration, this logic implies that ‘culpable’ leaders do not have incentives to end a war that will bring defeat. This paper argues that leaders can escape this dilemma by blaming and replacing their cabinet ministers for poor war results. Under a framework of war as a bargaining process, and using a database of the tenure of thousands of ministers of foreign affairs, this paper shows that the replacement of these cabinet ministers reduces the duration of interstate wars that end in defeat. These findings suggest that leaders do not necessarily need to continue fighting wars in order to avoid domestic punishment. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/906e6e69-ba38-4f5e-a45c-650528725257
- author
- Quiroz Flores, Alejandro ; Bäck, Hanna LU ; von Hagen-Jamar, Alexander LU and Teorell, Jan LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2017-12
- type
- Working paper/Preprint
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Ministers of foreign affaires, interstate war, Cabinet ministers, war duration
- in
- STANCE Working Papers Series
- volume
- 2017
- issue
- 11
- pages
- 26 pages
- project
- State-Making and the Origins of Global Order in the Long Nineteenth Century and Beyond
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 906e6e69-ba38-4f5e-a45c-650528725257
- date added to LUP
- 2018-01-29 14:33:42
- date last changed
- 2021-03-29 18:01:59
@misc{906e6e69-ba38-4f5e-a45c-650528725257, abstract = {{The prospects of domestic punishment might compel leaders responsible for the initiation of the war to continue fighting until they achieve favorable war outcomes (Croco 2011, 2015). As applied to war duration, this logic implies that ‘culpable’ leaders do not have incentives to end a war that will bring defeat. This paper argues that leaders can escape this dilemma by blaming and replacing their cabinet ministers for poor war results. Under a framework of war as a bargaining process, and using a database of the tenure of thousands of ministers of foreign affairs, this paper shows that the replacement of these cabinet ministers reduces the duration of interstate wars that end in defeat. These findings suggest that leaders do not necessarily need to continue fighting wars in order to avoid domestic punishment.}}, author = {{Quiroz Flores, Alejandro and Bäck, Hanna and von Hagen-Jamar, Alexander and Teorell, Jan}}, keywords = {{Ministers of foreign affaires; interstate war; Cabinet ministers; war duration}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Working Paper}}, number = {{11}}, pages = {{1--26}}, series = {{STANCE Working Papers Series}}, title = {{Solving the Decider’s Dilemma: Scapegoats, Foreign Affairs, and the Duration of Interstate War}}, url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/37691869/2017_11_Quiroz_Flores_Ba_ck_von_Hagen_Jamar_Teorell.pdf}}, volume = {{2017}}, year = {{2017}}, }