Overlapping multiple object assignments
(2017) In Economic Theory 63(3). p.723-753- Abstract
- This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple object assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers. Agents have complete, transitive and strict preferences over bundles of objects. A rule assigns objects to agents. A single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the agents satisfy a compatibility constraint. If no restrictions are imposed on the compatibility structure, there exists no rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and compatibility-monotonicity. Imposing two restrictions on the compatibility structure, the class of rules called compatibility-sorting sequential dictatorships can be fully characterized by four different combinations of group-strategyproofness, strategyproofness,... (More)
- This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple object assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers. Agents have complete, transitive and strict preferences over bundles of objects. A rule assigns objects to agents. A single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the agents satisfy a compatibility constraint. If no restrictions are imposed on the compatibility structure, there exists no rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and compatibility-monotonicity. Imposing two restrictions on the compatibility structure, the class of rules called compatibility-sorting sequential dictatorships can be fully characterized by four different combinations of group-strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, compatibility-monotonicity and compatibility-invariance. It is demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (J Public Econ Theory 3:258–271, 2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained as a special case of the main result. Finally, some additional properties are considered and an extension of the model introducing capacity constraints is presented. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8820960
- author
- Kratz, Jörgen LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2017-03-02
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- overlapping assignments, sharable goods, sequential dictatorship, compatibility
- in
- Economic Theory
- volume
- 63
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 31 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84975690909
- wos:000395196200005
- ISSN
- 1432-0479
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-016-0958-3
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 91207553-51c2-4fb4-b167-acba5ef7b1ba (old id 8820960)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 10:36:57
- date last changed
- 2022-03-12 07:26:12
@article{91207553-51c2-4fb4-b167-acba5ef7b1ba,
abstract = {{This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple object assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers. Agents have complete, transitive and strict preferences over bundles of objects. A rule assigns objects to agents. A single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the agents satisfy a compatibility constraint. If no restrictions are imposed on the compatibility structure, there exists no rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and compatibility-monotonicity. Imposing two restrictions on the compatibility structure, the class of rules called compatibility-sorting sequential dictatorships can be fully characterized by four different combinations of group-strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, compatibility-monotonicity and compatibility-invariance. It is demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (J Public Econ Theory 3:258–271, 2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained as a special case of the main result. Finally, some additional properties are considered and an extension of the model introducing capacity constraints is presented.}},
author = {{Kratz, Jörgen}},
issn = {{1432-0479}},
keywords = {{overlapping assignments; sharable goods; sequential dictatorship; compatibility}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{03}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{723--753}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Economic Theory}},
title = {{Overlapping multiple object assignments}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0958-3}},
doi = {{10.1007/s00199-016-0958-3}},
volume = {{63}},
year = {{2017}},
}