A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy
(2016) In Philosophical Studies 173(2). p.437-449- Abstract
- This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the confirmation theorist to come to terms with the problem, and argues that none of them are successful.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8739164
- author
- Jönsson, Martin LU and Assarsson, Elias LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2016
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Conjunction fallacy, Inverse conjunction fallacy, Bayesian epistemology, Bayesian confirmation theory, Formal measures of confirmation
- in
- Philosophical Studies
- volume
- 173
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 437 - 449
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000368225000010
- scopus:84955180703
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11098-015-0500-7
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9297df8b-dfb6-4b6f-ae51-58587b6cc739 (old id 8739164)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 13:38:08
- date last changed
- 2022-01-27 20:15:06
@article{9297df8b-dfb6-4b6f-ae51-58587b6cc739, abstract = {{This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the confirmation theorist to come to terms with the problem, and argues that none of them are successful.}}, author = {{Jönsson, Martin and Assarsson, Elias}}, issn = {{0031-8116}}, keywords = {{Conjunction fallacy; Inverse conjunction fallacy; Bayesian epistemology; Bayesian confirmation theory; Formal measures of confirmation}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{437--449}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Philosophical Studies}}, title = {{A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0500-7}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11098-015-0500-7}}, volume = {{173}}, year = {{2016}}, }