Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
(2008) In Social Choice and Welfare 30(2). p.181-196- Abstract
- This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and... (More)
- This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/986784
- author
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU and Torstensson, Pär LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2008
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Social Choice and Welfare
- volume
- 30
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 181 - 196
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000252282200001
- scopus:38149061123
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00355-007-0221-8
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 3bd091c3-800e-4115-afcd-7d79ab2e3db4 (old id 986784)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 12:54:37
- date last changed
- 2022-03-21 07:32:47
@article{3bd091c3-800e-4115-afcd-7d79ab2e3db4,
abstract = {{This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.}},
author = {{Svensson, Lars-Gunnar and Torstensson, Pär}},
issn = {{0176-1714}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{181--196}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Social Choice and Welfare}},
title = {{Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0221-8}},
doi = {{10.1007/s00355-007-0221-8}},
volume = {{30}},
year = {{2008}},
}