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Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU and Torstensson, Pär LU (2008) In Social Choice and Welfare 30(2). p.181-196
Abstract
This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and... (More)
This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Social Choice and Welfare
volume
30
issue
2
pages
181 - 196
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000252282200001
  • scopus:38149061123
ISSN
0176-1714
DOI
10.1007/s00355-007-0221-8
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
3bd091c3-800e-4115-afcd-7d79ab2e3db4 (old id 986784)
date added to LUP
2008-09-11 14:36:36
date last changed
2017-01-01 05:21:37
@article{3bd091c3-800e-4115-afcd-7d79ab2e3db4,
  abstract     = {This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1}	imes cdots 	imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1}	imes cdots 	imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.},
  author       = {Svensson, Lars-Gunnar and Torstensson, Pär},
  issn         = {0176-1714},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {181--196},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  title        = {Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0221-8},
  volume       = {30},
  year         = {2008},
}