Easy cleanups or forbearing improvements : The effect of CEO tenure on successor's performance
(2022) In Journal of Financial Stability 63.- Abstract
Long CEO tenure can harm firm performance even after the CEO is replaced. We analyze this issue by conditioning post-turnover firm performance on the length of the preceding CEO's tenure. Identification comes from instrumenting sudden CEO deaths as an exogenous shock to tenure length. We find that when a successor takes over after a long-tenured CEO, operating performance and stock returns are significantly lower, restructuring costs are higher, “big baths” are larger, and firm recovery is slower. Weaker corporate governance and a long-tenured CEO with lower skills amplify these post-turnover effects.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/9af08861-a53b-47e6-b445-eb8c16d7254a
- author
- Colak, Gonul and Liljeblom, Eva LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022-12-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- CEO tenure, CEO term limits, Firm performance, Hazard model, Restructuring costs, Shareholder value
- in
- Journal of Financial Stability
- volume
- 63
- article number
- 101072
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85138352755
- ISSN
- 1572-3089
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfs.2022.101072
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9af08861-a53b-47e6-b445-eb8c16d7254a
- date added to LUP
- 2022-12-02 13:57:18
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 14:53:25
@article{9af08861-a53b-47e6-b445-eb8c16d7254a, abstract = {{<p>Long CEO tenure can harm firm performance even after the CEO is replaced. We analyze this issue by conditioning post-turnover firm performance on the length of the preceding CEO's tenure. Identification comes from instrumenting sudden CEO deaths as an exogenous shock to tenure length. We find that when a successor takes over after a long-tenured CEO, operating performance and stock returns are significantly lower, restructuring costs are higher, “big baths” are larger, and firm recovery is slower. Weaker corporate governance and a long-tenured CEO with lower skills amplify these post-turnover effects.</p>}}, author = {{Colak, Gonul and Liljeblom, Eva}}, issn = {{1572-3089}}, keywords = {{CEO tenure; CEO term limits; Firm performance; Hazard model; Restructuring costs; Shareholder value}}, language = {{eng}}, month = {{12}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, series = {{Journal of Financial Stability}}, title = {{Easy cleanups or forbearing improvements : The effect of CEO tenure on successor's performance}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2022.101072}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jfs.2022.101072}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2022}}, }