Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application
(2019) In Studies in Economic Design p.445-450- Abstract
- This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g., kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications. Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and more research is needed to understand, e.g., how to model preferences, how to define relevant axioms, and how to specify multidimensional constraints.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/9ca6b262-b43a-4432-9b4e-73b4087efd13
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- The Future of Economic Design
- series title
- Studies in Economic Design
- editor
- Laslier, Jean-Francois ; Moulin, Herve ; Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, William
- pages
- 445 - 450
- publisher
- Springer
- ISBN
- 978-3-030-18050-8
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9ca6b262-b43a-4432-9b4e-73b4087efd13
- date added to LUP
- 2019-04-24 10:04:05
- date last changed
- 2025-12-04 14:55:51
@inbook{9ca6b262-b43a-4432-9b4e-73b4087efd13,
abstract = {{This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g., kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications. Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and more research is needed to understand, e.g., how to model preferences, how to define relevant axioms, and how to specify multidimensional constraints.}},
author = {{Andersson, Tommy}},
booktitle = {{The Future of Economic Design}},
editor = {{Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, William}},
isbn = {{978-3-030-18050-8}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{445--450}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Studies in Economic Design}},
title = {{Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application}},
year = {{2019}},
}