Two Countermeasures Against Hardware Trojans Exploiting Non-Zero Aliasing Probability of BIST
(2017) In Journal of Signal Processing Systems 87(3). p.371-381- Abstract
The threat of hardware Trojans has been widely recognized by academia, industry, and government agencies. A Trojan can compromise security of a system in spite of cryptographic protection. The damage caused by a Trojan may not be limited to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public safety, national economy, or national security. An extremely stealthy way of implementing hardware Trojans has been presented by Becker et al. at CHES’2012. Their work have shown that it is possible to inject a Trojan in a random number generator compliant with FIPS 140-2 and NIST SP800-90 standards by exploiting non-zero aliasing probability of Logic Built-In-Self-Test (LBIST). In this paper, we present two methods for modifying... (More)
The threat of hardware Trojans has been widely recognized by academia, industry, and government agencies. A Trojan can compromise security of a system in spite of cryptographic protection. The damage caused by a Trojan may not be limited to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public safety, national economy, or national security. An extremely stealthy way of implementing hardware Trojans has been presented by Becker et al. at CHES’2012. Their work have shown that it is possible to inject a Trojan in a random number generator compliant with FIPS 140-2 and NIST SP800-90 standards by exploiting non-zero aliasing probability of Logic Built-In-Self-Test (LBIST). In this paper, we present two methods for modifying LBIST to prevent such an attack. The first method makes test patterns dependent on a configurable key which is programed into a chip after the manufacturing stage. The second method uses a remote test management system which can execute LBIST using a different set of test patterns at each test cycle.
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- author
- Dubrova, Elena ; Näslund, Mats ; Carlsson, Gunnar ; Fornehed, John and Smeets, Ben LU
- publishing date
- 2017-06-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Countermeasure, Hardware Trojan, Logic BIST, Malicious hardware
- in
- Journal of Signal Processing Systems
- volume
- 87
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 11 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84960328861
- ISSN
- 1939-8018
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11265-016-1127-4
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- additional info
- Funding Information: The first author was supported in part by the research grant No SM14-0016 from the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research. Publisher Copyright: © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
- id
- 9ecb8b2b-9711-499f-869d-905212626417
- date added to LUP
- 2021-11-05 02:19:22
- date last changed
- 2022-03-11 21:16:49
@article{9ecb8b2b-9711-499f-869d-905212626417,
abstract = {{<p>The threat of hardware Trojans has been widely recognized by academia, industry, and government agencies. A Trojan can compromise security of a system in spite of cryptographic protection. The damage caused by a Trojan may not be limited to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public safety, national economy, or national security. An extremely stealthy way of implementing hardware Trojans has been presented by Becker et al. at CHES’2012. Their work have shown that it is possible to inject a Trojan in a random number generator compliant with FIPS 140-2 and NIST SP800-90 standards by exploiting non-zero aliasing probability of Logic Built-In-Self-Test (LBIST). In this paper, we present two methods for modifying LBIST to prevent such an attack. The first method makes test patterns dependent on a configurable key which is programed into a chip after the manufacturing stage. The second method uses a remote test management system which can execute LBIST using a different set of test patterns at each test cycle.</p>}},
author = {{Dubrova, Elena and Näslund, Mats and Carlsson, Gunnar and Fornehed, John and Smeets, Ben}},
issn = {{1939-8018}},
keywords = {{Countermeasure; Hardware Trojan; Logic BIST; Malicious hardware}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{06}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{371--381}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Journal of Signal Processing Systems}},
title = {{Two Countermeasures Against Hardware Trojans Exploiting Non-Zero Aliasing Probability of BIST}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11265-016-1127-4}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11265-016-1127-4}},
volume = {{87}},
year = {{2017}},
}