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Leave inference alone : Direct inferential social cognition

Lo Presti, Patrizio LU (2020) In Theory & Psychology 30(2). p.186-201
Abstract
Direct perception and theory-theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This paper argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one where both sides can be right. The argument, then, is... (More)
Direct perception and theory-theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This paper argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one where both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
social cognition, inference, direct access, affordance
in
Theory & Psychology
volume
30
issue
2
pages
186 - 201
publisher
SAGE Publications
external identifiers
  • scopus:85081588784
ISSN
0959-3543
DOI
10.1177/0959354320908337
project
A dispute on the rationale for methodological individualism
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
a0184f7e-f8a5-4342-83c5-60296e244600
date added to LUP
2019-11-12 12:03:42
date last changed
2020-05-05 14:32:32
@article{a0184f7e-f8a5-4342-83c5-60296e244600,
  abstract     = {Direct perception and theory-theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This paper argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one where both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition.},
  author       = {Lo Presti, Patrizio},
  issn         = {0959-3543},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {04},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {186--201},
  publisher    = {SAGE Publications},
  series       = {Theory & Psychology},
  title        = {Leave inference alone : Direct inferential social cognition},
  url          = {https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/78819400/Lo_Presti_P._2020b_._Leave_inference_alone.pdf},
  doi          = {10.1177/0959354320908337},
  volume       = {30},
  year         = {2020},
}