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Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting

Bucciol, Alessandro ; Montinari, Natalia LU and Piovesan, Marco (2015) In Scandinavian Journal of Economics 117(4). p.1204-1229
Abstract
This paper examines whether combining non-monetary and monetary incentives increases municipal solid waste sorting. We empirically investigate this issue, exploiting the exogenous variation in waste management policies experienced during the years 1999–2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). Using a panel regression analysis, we estimate that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive schemes increase by 17% the sorted-to-total waste ratio and that their effect reinforces that of a door-to-door (DtD) collection system, which is equal to 15.7%. Moreover, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to find learning and spatial effects associated to both PAYT and DtD.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Environment, Waste Management, PAYT.
in
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
volume
117
issue
4
pages
1204 - 1229
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • wos:000362207000006
  • scopus:84942366374
ISSN
1467-9442
DOI
10.1111/sjoe.12122
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
a23f0ba4-2b9c-48a6-9bf9-92c3e1419707 (old id 4823811)
date added to LUP
2016-04-01 10:09:41
date last changed
2022-02-09 23:18:53
@article{a23f0ba4-2b9c-48a6-9bf9-92c3e1419707,
  abstract     = {{This paper examines whether combining non-monetary and monetary incentives increases municipal solid waste sorting. We empirically investigate this issue, exploiting the exogenous variation in waste management policies experienced during the years 1999–2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). Using a panel regression analysis, we estimate that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive schemes increase by 17% the sorted-to-total waste ratio and that their effect reinforces that of a door-to-door (DtD) collection system, which is equal to 15.7%. Moreover, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to find learning and spatial effects associated to both PAYT and DtD.}},
  author       = {{Bucciol, Alessandro and Montinari, Natalia and Piovesan, Marco}},
  issn         = {{1467-9442}},
  keywords     = {{Environment; Waste Management; PAYT.}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{1204--1229}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  series       = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}},
  title        = {{Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12122}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/sjoe.12122}},
  volume       = {{117}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}