Subjectivism and Relational Good
(2018) In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21(2). p.359-370- Abstract
In this paper, a distinctly subjectivist analysis of the nature of relational goodness or goodness for is proposed. Like the generic subjectivist analysis of value, the proposal is to analyse value in terms of attitudes. Specifically, the proposed analysis of goodness for appeals to a special kind of attitude: namely, so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. Unlike other analyses in the literature that have appealed to this kind of attitude, the analysis proposed here is not a fitting-attitude analysis. Rather than appealing to for-someone’s-sake attitudes that it is fitting to have or that there are reasons to have, the proposed analysis takes actually held for-someone’s-sake attitudes to ground or constitute goodness for (relative to... (More)
In this paper, a distinctly subjectivist analysis of the nature of relational goodness or goodness for is proposed. Like the generic subjectivist analysis of value, the proposal is to analyse value in terms of attitudes. Specifically, the proposed analysis of goodness for appeals to a special kind of attitude: namely, so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. Unlike other analyses in the literature that have appealed to this kind of attitude, the analysis proposed here is not a fitting-attitude analysis. Rather than appealing to for-someone’s-sake attitudes that it is fitting to have or that there are reasons to have, the proposed analysis takes actually held for-someone’s-sake attitudes to ground or constitute goodness for (relative to the subject who holds the attitude). The analysis should be attractive to those already within the subjectivist camp. One of its appeals is that it is a special case of a general subjectivist approach to values, thus showing that subjectivism provides the resources to analyse relational values.
(Less)
- author
- Fritzson, Fritz Anton LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2018-04-09
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Constitutive ground of value, Good and good for, Good relative to, Personal value, Relational value, Value subjectivism
- in
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- volume
- 21
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 359 - 370
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85045085583
- ISSN
- 1386-2820
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10677-018-9886-6
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- aa3f24d2-38ac-4be9-a4b0-aa698eb7cf65
- date added to LUP
- 2018-04-17 14:31:32
- date last changed
- 2022-01-31 03:02:07
@article{aa3f24d2-38ac-4be9-a4b0-aa698eb7cf65,
abstract = {{<p>In this paper, a distinctly subjectivist analysis of the nature of relational goodness or goodness for is proposed. Like the generic subjectivist analysis of value, the proposal is to analyse value in terms of attitudes. Specifically, the proposed analysis of goodness for appeals to a special kind of attitude: namely, so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. Unlike other analyses in the literature that have appealed to this kind of attitude, the analysis proposed here is not a fitting-attitude analysis. Rather than appealing to for-someone’s-sake attitudes that it is fitting to have or that there are reasons to have, the proposed analysis takes actually held for-someone’s-sake attitudes to ground or constitute goodness for (relative to the subject who holds the attitude). The analysis should be attractive to those already within the subjectivist camp. One of its appeals is that it is a special case of a general subjectivist approach to values, thus showing that subjectivism provides the resources to analyse relational values.</p>}},
author = {{Fritzson, Fritz Anton}},
issn = {{1386-2820}},
keywords = {{Constitutive ground of value; Good and good for; Good relative to; Personal value; Relational value; Value subjectivism}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{04}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{359--370}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Ethical Theory and Moral Practice}},
title = {{Subjectivism and Relational Good}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9886-6}},
doi = {{10.1007/s10677-018-9886-6}},
volume = {{21}},
year = {{2018}},
}