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Subjectivism and Relational Good

Fritzson, Fritz Anton LU (2018) In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21(2). p.359-370
Abstract

In this paper, a distinctly subjectivist analysis of the nature of relational goodness or goodness for is proposed. Like the generic subjectivist analysis of value, the proposal is to analyse value in terms of attitudes. Specifically, the proposed analysis of goodness for appeals to a special kind of attitude: namely, so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. Unlike other analyses in the literature that have appealed to this kind of attitude, the analysis proposed here is not a fitting-attitude analysis. Rather than appealing to for-someone’s-sake attitudes that it is fitting to have or that there are reasons to have, the proposed analysis takes actually held for-someone’s-sake attitudes to ground or constitute goodness for (relative to... (More)

In this paper, a distinctly subjectivist analysis of the nature of relational goodness or goodness for is proposed. Like the generic subjectivist analysis of value, the proposal is to analyse value in terms of attitudes. Specifically, the proposed analysis of goodness for appeals to a special kind of attitude: namely, so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. Unlike other analyses in the literature that have appealed to this kind of attitude, the analysis proposed here is not a fitting-attitude analysis. Rather than appealing to for-someone’s-sake attitudes that it is fitting to have or that there are reasons to have, the proposed analysis takes actually held for-someone’s-sake attitudes to ground or constitute goodness for (relative to the subject who holds the attitude). The analysis should be attractive to those already within the subjectivist camp. One of its appeals is that it is a special case of a general subjectivist approach to values, thus showing that subjectivism provides the resources to analyse relational values.

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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Constitutive ground of value, Good and good for, Good relative to, Personal value, Relational value, Value subjectivism
in
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
volume
21
issue
2
pages
359 - 370
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:85045085583
ISSN
1386-2820
DOI
10.1007/s10677-018-9886-6
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
aa3f24d2-38ac-4be9-a4b0-aa698eb7cf65
date added to LUP
2018-04-17 14:31:32
date last changed
2019-02-20 11:14:30
@article{aa3f24d2-38ac-4be9-a4b0-aa698eb7cf65,
  abstract     = {<p>In this paper, a distinctly subjectivist analysis of the nature of relational goodness or goodness for is proposed. Like the generic subjectivist analysis of value, the proposal is to analyse value in terms of attitudes. Specifically, the proposed analysis of goodness for appeals to a special kind of attitude: namely, so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. Unlike other analyses in the literature that have appealed to this kind of attitude, the analysis proposed here is not a fitting-attitude analysis. Rather than appealing to for-someone’s-sake attitudes that it is fitting to have or that there are reasons to have, the proposed analysis takes actually held for-someone’s-sake attitudes to ground or constitute goodness for (relative to the subject who holds the attitude). The analysis should be attractive to those already within the subjectivist camp. One of its appeals is that it is a special case of a general subjectivist approach to values, thus showing that subjectivism provides the resources to analyse relational values.</p>},
  author       = {Fritzson, Fritz Anton},
  issn         = {1386-2820},
  keyword      = {Constitutive ground of value,Good and good for,Good relative to,Personal value,Relational value,Value subjectivism},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {04},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {359--370},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
  title        = {Subjectivism and Relational Good},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9886-6},
  volume       = {21},
  year         = {2018},
}