Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
(2022) In Mathematics of Operations Research 47(4). p.3110-3128- Abstract
- We consider taxation of exchanges among a set of agents in which each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects, and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. We show that, if a rule satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, constrained efficiency, weak anonymity, and weak consistency, then it is either the no-trade rule or a fixed-tax core rule. For the latter rules, whenever any agent exchanges an object, the agent pays the same fixed tax (a lump sum payment that is identical for all agents) independently of which object the agent consumes. Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm finds the final assignment using the agents’ valuations adjusted with the fixed tax if the induced preferences are strict.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/b3822afb-2161-4fe1-a9de-a73376dbf407
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU ; Ehlers, Lars ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU and Tierney, Ryan
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022-03-15
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Mathematics of Operations Research
- volume
- 47
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 3110 - 3128
- publisher
- INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85130541861
- ISSN
- 0364-765X
- DOI
- 10.1287/moor.2021.1244
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- b3822afb-2161-4fe1-a9de-a73376dbf407
- date added to LUP
- 2021-11-13 18:08:39
- date last changed
- 2025-02-09 07:42:54
@article{b3822afb-2161-4fe1-a9de-a73376dbf407, abstract = {{We consider taxation of exchanges among a set of agents in which each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects, and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. We show that, if a rule satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, constrained efficiency, weak anonymity, and weak consistency, then it is either the no-trade rule or a fixed-tax core rule. For the latter rules, whenever any agent exchanges an object, the agent pays the same fixed tax (a lump sum payment that is identical for all agents) independently of which object the agent consumes. Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm finds the final assignment using the agents’ valuations adjusted with the fixed tax if the induced preferences are strict.}}, author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Ehlers, Lars and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar and Tierney, Ryan}}, issn = {{0364-765X}}, language = {{eng}}, month = {{03}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{3110--3128}}, publisher = {{INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences}}, series = {{Mathematics of Operations Research}}, title = {{Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1244}}, doi = {{10.1287/moor.2021.1244}}, volume = {{47}}, year = {{2022}}, }