A Two-Front Battle. On the Justification of Empirical Beliefs.
(2001)- Abstract
- The question of what justifies empirical beliefs is traditionally answered either by reference to basic empirical beliefs that receive justification from something outside of the epistemic subject’s conceptual sphere or by reference to justification through coherence, in the sense that empirical beliefs are justified through their semantic relations to other beliefs. Typical of both kinds of answers is that they aim at a general notion of belief justification. This work argues that justification of empirical beliefs must be answered in a dualistic framework, where the key notions are coherence and reliability. The inherent dualism stems from the fact that the two justificatory strategies are essentially irreducible in terms of each other.... (More)
- The question of what justifies empirical beliefs is traditionally answered either by reference to basic empirical beliefs that receive justification from something outside of the epistemic subject’s conceptual sphere or by reference to justification through coherence, in the sense that empirical beliefs are justified through their semantic relations to other beliefs. Typical of both kinds of answers is that they aim at a general notion of belief justification. This work argues that justification of empirical beliefs must be answered in a dualistic framework, where the key notions are coherence and reliability. The inherent dualism stems from the fact that the two justificatory strategies are essentially irreducible in terms of each other. The main goal is to show that this dualistic concept of justification is robust enough to make search for universal knowledge meaningful. However, the author also stresses the importance of cultural elements in belief justification, and points to how this leads to an epistemological defense of the norm of tolerance towards other belief systems and conceptual schemes. (Less)
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Popular Abstract in Swedish
I dag konfronterar människor en större mångfald än någonsin. Begreppssystem av olika struktur och innehåll utmanar föreställningen om universell kunskap och skapar spänning mellan olika kulturella och lingvistiska kommuniteter. Denna bok argumenterar för att det sätt på vilket vi rättfärdigar våra trosföreställningar har implikationer för det meningsfulla i att söka universell kunskap och även för normen att vi bör vara toleranta mot begreppssystem som strider mot våra egna. Författaren sammanbinder dessa två frågor i ett teoretiskt ramverk och ger ett försvar både för universell kunskap och tolerans. Det hävdas att statusen hos våra trosföreställningar bestäms både av yttervärlden och av... (More) - Popular Abstract in Swedish
I dag konfronterar människor en större mångfald än någonsin. Begreppssystem av olika struktur och innehåll utmanar föreställningen om universell kunskap och skapar spänning mellan olika kulturella och lingvistiska kommuniteter. Denna bok argumenterar för att det sätt på vilket vi rättfärdigar våra trosföreställningar har implikationer för det meningsfulla i att söka universell kunskap och även för normen att vi bör vara toleranta mot begreppssystem som strider mot våra egna. Författaren sammanbinder dessa två frågor i ett teoretiskt ramverk och ger ett försvar både för universell kunskap och tolerans. Det hävdas att statusen hos våra trosföreställningar bestäms både av yttervärlden och av kulturella och språkliga faktorer. Denna dubbla natur enligt vilken vi rättfärdigar våra empiriska trosföreställningar motiverar ödmjukhet gentemot andra begreppssystem men upprättar också ett bålverk gentemot total relativism. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/19990
- author
- Poirier Martinsson, Roland LU
- supervisor
- opponent
-
- Dupré, John
- organization
- publishing date
- 2001
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Philosophical logic, tolerance, empiricism, justification, reliabilism, coherence, foundationalism, Teoretisk filosofi, logik
- pages
- 164 pages
- publisher
- Bjärnums Trycekri AB. Bjärnum. Sweden.,
- defense location
- Karolinasalen, Kungshuset
- defense date
- 2001-09-19 13:00:00
- ISBN
- 91-89336-07-0
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- b81efa4a-8fe0-41d4-b837-217d9e5fef08 (old id 19990)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 10:37:55
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 20:59:52
@phdthesis{b81efa4a-8fe0-41d4-b837-217d9e5fef08,
abstract = {{The question of what justifies empirical beliefs is traditionally answered either by reference to basic empirical beliefs that receive justification from something outside of the epistemic subject’s conceptual sphere or by reference to justification through coherence, in the sense that empirical beliefs are justified through their semantic relations to other beliefs. Typical of both kinds of answers is that they aim at a general notion of belief justification. This work argues that justification of empirical beliefs must be answered in a dualistic framework, where the key notions are coherence and reliability. The inherent dualism stems from the fact that the two justificatory strategies are essentially irreducible in terms of each other. The main goal is to show that this dualistic concept of justification is robust enough to make search for universal knowledge meaningful. However, the author also stresses the importance of cultural elements in belief justification, and points to how this leads to an epistemological defense of the norm of tolerance towards other belief systems and conceptual schemes.}},
author = {{Poirier Martinsson, Roland}},
isbn = {{91-89336-07-0}},
keywords = {{Philosophical logic; tolerance; empiricism; justification; reliabilism; coherence; foundationalism; Teoretisk filosofi; logik}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Bjärnums Trycekri AB. Bjärnum. Sweden.,}},
school = {{Lund University}},
title = {{A Two-Front Battle. On the Justification of Empirical Beliefs.}},
year = {{2001}},
}