Acquisitions for Sleep
(2020) In B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 20(2).- Abstract
Within the policy debate, there is a fear that large incumbent firms buy small firms' inventions to ensure that they are not used in the market. We show that such "acquisitions for sleep" can occur if and only if the quality of a process invention is small; otherwise, the entry profit will be higher than the entry-deterring value. We then show that the incentive for acquiring for the purpose of putting a patent to sleep decreases when the intellectual property law is stricter because the profit for the entrant then increases more than the entry-deterring value does.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/bcf43bdc-2fde-44c5-9e9a-79a81d8c6bed
- author
- Norbäck, Pehr Johan ; Olofsson, Charlotta LU and Persson, Lars LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020-02-26
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- acquisitions, innovation, IP law, ownership, sleeping patents
- in
- B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
- volume
- 20
- issue
- 2
- publisher
- De Gruyter
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85081581903
- ISSN
- 1935-1682
- DOI
- 10.1515/bejeap-2019-0021
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- bcf43bdc-2fde-44c5-9e9a-79a81d8c6bed
- date added to LUP
- 2020-04-14 15:44:40
- date last changed
- 2022-04-18 21:56:15
@article{bcf43bdc-2fde-44c5-9e9a-79a81d8c6bed, abstract = {{<p>Within the policy debate, there is a fear that large incumbent firms buy small firms' inventions to ensure that they are not used in the market. We show that such "acquisitions for sleep" can occur if and only if the quality of a process invention is small; otherwise, the entry profit will be higher than the entry-deterring value. We then show that the incentive for acquiring for the purpose of putting a patent to sleep decreases when the intellectual property law is stricter because the profit for the entrant then increases more than the entry-deterring value does.</p>}}, author = {{Norbäck, Pehr Johan and Olofsson, Charlotta and Persson, Lars}}, issn = {{1935-1682}}, keywords = {{acquisitions; innovation; IP law; ownership; sleeping patents}}, language = {{eng}}, month = {{02}}, number = {{2}}, publisher = {{De Gruyter}}, series = {{B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy}}, title = {{Acquisitions for Sleep}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2019-0021}}, doi = {{10.1515/bejeap-2019-0021}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2020}}, }