Strategy-proof allocation of objects : A characterization result
(2024) In Mathematical Social Sciences 128. p.1-5- Abstract
This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/bdb6647f-3544-47be-9b82-f0f08ddecaaa
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU and Svensson, Lars Gunnar LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024-03
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Characterization, House allocation, Multi-object auction, Strategy-proofness
- in
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- volume
- 128
- pages
- 5 pages
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85181837965
- ISSN
- 0165-4896
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- bdb6647f-3544-47be-9b82-f0f08ddecaaa
- date added to LUP
- 2024-02-13 11:37:21
- date last changed
- 2024-02-13 11:39:05
@article{bdb6647f-3544-47be-9b82-f0f08ddecaaa, abstract = {{<p>This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.</p>}}, author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Svensson, Lars Gunnar}}, issn = {{0165-4896}}, keywords = {{Characterization; House allocation; Multi-object auction; Strategy-proofness}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{1--5}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, series = {{Mathematical Social Sciences}}, title = {{Strategy-proof allocation of objects : A characterization result}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004}}, volume = {{128}}, year = {{2024}}, }