Increased cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas : Can it be explained by risk sharing?
(2025) In Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 114.- Abstract
A potential mechanism to explain changes in cooperativeness in the presence of risk may be opportunities for informal risk sharing. Using a novel experimental design, we show that the presence of both independent and correlated risk prevents the typical decay of cooperation in a laboratory social dilemma game. Notably, this result seems to rule out risk sharing as a possible mechanism behind the cooperation increase. Exploratory analyses tentatively suggest that behavior consistent with a risk sharing account may emerge late in the game, congruent with previous theorizing of slow learning in stochastic environments.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/c9dbcda0-aa1f-448d-8e08-c1e2685a17e5
- author
- Vesely, Stepan and Wengström, Erik LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2025-02
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Cooperation under risk, Public good game, Risk sharing
- in
- Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- volume
- 114
- article number
- 102309
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85209662237
- ISSN
- 2214-8043
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102309
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- Publisher Copyright: © 2024
- id
- c9dbcda0-aa1f-448d-8e08-c1e2685a17e5
- date added to LUP
- 2024-11-28 12:00:26
- date last changed
- 2025-05-08 13:08:13
@article{c9dbcda0-aa1f-448d-8e08-c1e2685a17e5,
abstract = {{<p>A potential mechanism to explain changes in cooperativeness in the presence of risk may be opportunities for informal risk sharing. Using a novel experimental design, we show that the presence of both independent and correlated risk prevents the typical decay of cooperation in a laboratory social dilemma game. Notably, this result seems to rule out risk sharing as a possible mechanism behind the cooperation increase. Exploratory analyses tentatively suggest that behavior consistent with a risk sharing account may emerge late in the game, congruent with previous theorizing of slow learning in stochastic environments.</p>}},
author = {{Vesely, Stepan and Wengström, Erik}},
issn = {{2214-8043}},
keywords = {{Cooperation under risk; Public good game; Risk sharing}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
series = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}},
title = {{Increased cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas : Can it be explained by risk sharing?}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102309}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.socec.2024.102309}},
volume = {{114}},
year = {{2025}},
}