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Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability

Bergh, Andreas LU ; Erlingsson, Gissur LU ; Gustafsson, Anders and Wittberg, Emanuel (2019) In Public Integrity 21(3). p.320-352
Abstract

The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to... (More)

The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.

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author
; ; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Accountability, Corruption, Hybrid Organizations, Local Government, Moral Hazard, New Public Management, Principal-Agent Theory, Publicly Owned Enterprises, Social Networks, Transparency
in
Public Integrity
volume
21
issue
3
pages
320 - 352
publisher
Taylor & Francis
external identifiers
  • scopus:85059763051
ISSN
1099-9922
DOI
10.1080/10999922.2018.1522182
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
cade5282-77c8-490f-97c6-a702b22f292c
date added to LUP
2018-09-18 14:58:11
date last changed
2022-04-25 08:55:54
@article{cade5282-77c8-490f-97c6-a702b22f292c,
  abstract     = {{<p>The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.</p>}},
  author       = {{Bergh, Andreas and Erlingsson, Gissur and Gustafsson, Anders and Wittberg, Emanuel}},
  issn         = {{1099-9922}},
  keywords     = {{Accountability; Corruption; Hybrid Organizations; Local Government; Moral Hazard; New Public Management; Principal-Agent Theory; Publicly Owned Enterprises; Social Networks; Transparency}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{320--352}},
  publisher    = {{Taylor & Francis}},
  series       = {{Public Integrity}},
  title        = {{Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2018.1522182}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/10999922.2018.1522182}},
  volume       = {{21}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}