A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited
(2009) In Economics Bulletin 29(3). p.1719-1724- Abstract
- This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1451850
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2009
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- assignment game, fairness, strategy-proofness
- in
- Economics Bulletin
- volume
- 29
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 1719 - 1724
- publisher
- Economics Bulletin
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:77952897844
- ISSN
- 1545-2921
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- ccd6f2ea-d82b-4a2a-8333-973dbc81b3bc (old id 1451850)
- alternative location
- http://www.economicsbulletin.com/
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 09:15:12
- date last changed
- 2022-01-29 17:00:40
@article{ccd6f2ea-d82b-4a2a-8333-973dbc81b3bc,
abstract = {{This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.}},
author = {{Andersson, Tommy}},
issn = {{1545-2921}},
keywords = {{assignment game; fairness; strategy-proofness}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{1719--1724}},
publisher = {{Economics Bulletin}},
series = {{Economics Bulletin}},
title = {{A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/5273620/1509569}},
volume = {{29}},
year = {{2009}},
}