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Cabinets, Prime Ministers and Corruption. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Governments in Post-war Europe

Bäck, Hanna LU orcid ; Teorell, Jan LU orcid and Lindberg, Staffan I LU (2019) In Political Studies 67(1). p.149-170
Abstract
Why are some states more corrupt than others? Drawing on the literature on governance in parliamentary democracies, we suggest that the degree of corruption depends on the ability of key political actors to control ministers who have been delegated power. We argue that the Prime Minister has incentives to limit corruption within the cabinet and has the ability to do so when there are certain “control mechanisms” at hand. One such mechanism is the PM’s ability to fire or demote ministers who are not behaving in accordance with his or her wishes. We hypothesize that governmental corruption will be lower in systems where the constitution grants the PM strong powers. Using a new dataset (Varieties of Democracy), which provides more specific... (More)
Why are some states more corrupt than others? Drawing on the literature on governance in parliamentary democracies, we suggest that the degree of corruption depends on the ability of key political actors to control ministers who have been delegated power. We argue that the Prime Minister has incentives to limit corruption within the cabinet and has the ability to do so when there are certain “control mechanisms” at hand. One such mechanism is the PM’s ability to fire or demote ministers who are not behaving in accordance with his or her wishes. We hypothesize that governmental corruption will be lower in systems where the constitution grants the PM strong powers. Using a new dataset (Varieties of Democracy), which provides more specific measures on high-level corruption across a longer time period, we analyze corruption in 26 West and East European democracies over the post-war period and find support for our hypothesis. (Less)
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author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
coalition governments, government corruption, Prime Ministers, principal–agent theory, parliamentary systems
in
Political Studies
volume
67
issue
1
pages
149 - 170
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • scopus:85060522326
ISSN
0032-3217
DOI
10.1177/0032321718760806
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
cf022ff7-2925-4ecd-8c3a-c4acdd75122f
date added to LUP
2018-04-03 10:52:28
date last changed
2024-01-14 17:47:51
@article{cf022ff7-2925-4ecd-8c3a-c4acdd75122f,
  abstract     = {{Why are some states more corrupt than others? Drawing on the literature on governance in parliamentary democracies, we suggest that the degree of corruption depends on the ability of key political actors to control ministers who have been delegated power. We argue that the Prime Minister has incentives to limit corruption within the cabinet and has the ability to do so when there are certain “control mechanisms” at hand. One such mechanism is the PM’s ability to fire or demote ministers who are not behaving in accordance with his or her wishes. We hypothesize that governmental corruption will be lower in systems where the constitution grants the PM strong powers. Using a new dataset (Varieties of Democracy), which provides more specific measures on high-level corruption across a longer time period, we analyze corruption in 26 West and East European democracies over the post-war period and find support for our hypothesis.}},
  author       = {{Bäck, Hanna and Teorell, Jan and Lindberg, Staffan I}},
  issn         = {{0032-3217}},
  keywords     = {{coalition governments; government corruption; Prime Ministers; principal–agent theory; parliamentary systems}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{149--170}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  series       = {{Political Studies}},
  title        = {{Cabinets, Prime Ministers and Corruption. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Governments in Post-war Europe}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032321718760806}},
  doi          = {{10.1177/0032321718760806}},
  volume       = {{67}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}