Endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games An explorative experimental study
(2010) In International Journal of Industrial Organization 28(5). p.477-495- Abstract
- This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are asymmetric, since asymmetries provide a tacit coordination cue used by experienced players (as a substitute to communication). It is also shown that although communication is used both to achieve market domination equilibria and cooperative market separating equilibria, the latter type of communication is much more common and successful. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1697705
- author
- Andersson, Ola LU and Holm, Hakan J.
- organization
- publishing date
- 2010
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Communication, Market entry, Coordination
- in
- International Journal of Industrial Organization
- volume
- 28
- issue
- 5
- pages
- 477 - 495
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000281490300006
- scopus:78049309518
- ISSN
- 0167-7187
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.11.003
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- d0b2b9a3-d8cd-4b38-a411-11aa163ce5ef (old id 1697705)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:10:58
- date last changed
- 2022-01-27 23:12:22
@article{d0b2b9a3-d8cd-4b38-a411-11aa163ce5ef,
abstract = {{This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are asymmetric, since asymmetries provide a tacit coordination cue used by experienced players (as a substitute to communication). It is also shown that although communication is used both to achieve market domination equilibria and cooperative market separating equilibria, the latter type of communication is much more common and successful. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}},
author = {{Andersson, Ola and Holm, Hakan J.}},
issn = {{0167-7187}},
keywords = {{Communication; Market entry; Coordination}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{5}},
pages = {{477--495}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
series = {{International Journal of Industrial Organization}},
title = {{Endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games An explorative experimental study}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.11.003}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.11.003}},
volume = {{28}},
year = {{2010}},
}