Self-Stigma, Bad Faith and the Experiential Self
(2019) In Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences 391-405. p.391-405- Abstract
The concept of self-stigmatization is guided by a representational account of selfhood that fails to accommodate for resilience against, and recovery from, stigma. Mainstream research on self-stigma has portrayed it only as a reified self, that is, as collectively shared stereotypes representing individuals’ identity. Self-stigma viewed phenomenologically, however, elucidates what facilitates a stigmatized self. A phenomenological analysis discloses the lived phenomenon of stigma as an act of self-objectification, as related to the experiential self, and therefore an achievement of subjectivity. Following a phenomenological account, the stigmatized self can thus return to a state-of-being, similar to that Jean-Paul Sartre once referred... (More)
The concept of self-stigmatization is guided by a representational account of selfhood that fails to accommodate for resilience against, and recovery from, stigma. Mainstream research on self-stigma has portrayed it only as a reified self, that is, as collectively shared stereotypes representing individuals’ identity. Self-stigma viewed phenomenologically, however, elucidates what facilitates a stigmatized self. A phenomenological analysis discloses the lived phenomenon of stigma as an act of self-objectification, as related to the experiential self, and therefore an achievement of subjectivity. Following a phenomenological account, the stigmatized self can thus return to a state-of-being, similar to that Jean-Paul Sartre once referred to as bad faith. Regarding your identity as analogous to an inanimate thing is ultimately self-deceptive. Self-stigma is here phenomenologically illuminated as constituted by basic discretion, that is, as a minimal form of agency. The study found that basic discretion can uphold the possibility for emancipation from a stigmatized self.
(Less)
- author
- Eriksson, Karl LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019-04-23
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Bad faith, Experiential self, Internalization, Phenomenology, Representationalism, Self-stigma
- in
- Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences
- volume
- 391-405
- pages
- 391 - 405
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85064813498
- ISSN
- 0163-8548
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10746-019-09504-8
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- d1f5fa23-3ce6-4c38-9e84-04050d486c1e
- date added to LUP
- 2019-05-08 13:16:35
- date last changed
- 2025-10-14 12:33:31
@article{d1f5fa23-3ce6-4c38-9e84-04050d486c1e,
abstract = {{<p>The concept of self-stigmatization is guided by a representational account of selfhood that fails to accommodate for resilience against, and recovery from, stigma. Mainstream research on self-stigma has portrayed it only as a reified self, that is, as collectively shared stereotypes representing individuals’ identity. Self-stigma viewed phenomenologically, however, elucidates what facilitates a stigmatized self. A phenomenological analysis discloses the lived phenomenon of stigma as an act of self-objectification, as related to the experiential self, and therefore an achievement of subjectivity. Following a phenomenological account, the stigmatized self can thus return to a state-of-being, similar to that Jean-Paul Sartre once referred to as bad faith. Regarding your identity as analogous to an inanimate thing is ultimately self-deceptive. Self-stigma is here phenomenologically illuminated as constituted by basic discretion, that is, as a minimal form of agency. The study found that basic discretion can uphold the possibility for emancipation from a stigmatized self.</p>}},
author = {{Eriksson, Karl}},
issn = {{0163-8548}},
keywords = {{Bad faith; Experiential self; Internalization; Phenomenology; Representationalism; Self-stigma}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{04}},
pages = {{391--405}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences}},
title = {{Self-Stigma, Bad Faith and the Experiential Self}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-019-09504-8}},
doi = {{10.1007/s10746-019-09504-8}},
volume = {{391-405}},
year = {{2019}},
}