Causing Global Warming
(2019) In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22(2). p.399-424- Abstract
Do I cause global warming, climate change and their related harms when I go for a leisure drive with my gas-guzzling car? The current verdict seems to be that I do not; the emissions produced by my drive are much too insignificant to make a difference for the occurrence of global warming and its related harms. I argue that our verdict on this issue depends on what we mean by ‘causation’. If we for instance assume a simple counterfactual analysis of causation according to which ‘C causes E’ means ‘if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred’, we must conclude that a single drive does not cause global warming. However, this analysis of causation is well-known for giving counterintuitive results in some important cases. If we instead... (More)
Do I cause global warming, climate change and their related harms when I go for a leisure drive with my gas-guzzling car? The current verdict seems to be that I do not; the emissions produced by my drive are much too insignificant to make a difference for the occurrence of global warming and its related harms. I argue that our verdict on this issue depends on what we mean by ‘causation’. If we for instance assume a simple counterfactual analysis of causation according to which ‘C causes E’ means ‘if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred’, we must conclude that a single drive does not cause global warming. However, this analysis of causation is well-known for giving counterintuitive results in some important cases. If we instead adopt Lewis’s (2000) analysis of causation, it turns out that it is indeterminate whether I cause global warming (etc.) when I go for a single drive. Still, in contexts where we seek to control or understand global warming, there is a pressure to adopt a more fragile view of this event. When we adopt such a view, it turns out that a single drive does cause global warming (etc.). This means that we cannot like Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) and Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong (2018) reject the idea that I should refrain from going for a leisure drive simply because such a drive does not cause global warming.
(Less)
- author
- Gunnemyr, Mattias LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Causal influence, Causation, Causing harm, David Lewis, Global warming, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- in
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- volume
- 22
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 399 - 424
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85064241290
- ISSN
- 1386-2820
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10677-019-09990-w
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- d57199c5-8888-4674-bcb1-d0de411a2a30
- date added to LUP
- 2019-05-02 15:05:40
- date last changed
- 2022-04-25 22:46:01
@article{d57199c5-8888-4674-bcb1-d0de411a2a30, abstract = {{<p>Do I cause global warming, climate change and their related harms when I go for a leisure drive with my gas-guzzling car? The current verdict seems to be that I do not; the emissions produced by my drive are much too insignificant to make a difference for the occurrence of global warming and its related harms. I argue that our verdict on this issue depends on what we mean by ‘causation’. If we for instance assume a simple counterfactual analysis of causation according to which ‘C causes E’ means ‘if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred’, we must conclude that a single drive does not cause global warming. However, this analysis of causation is well-known for giving counterintuitive results in some important cases. If we instead adopt Lewis’s (2000) analysis of causation, it turns out that it is indeterminate whether I cause global warming (etc.) when I go for a single drive. Still, in contexts where we seek to control or understand global warming, there is a pressure to adopt a more fragile view of this event. When we adopt such a view, it turns out that a single drive does cause global warming (etc.). This means that we cannot like Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) and Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong (2018) reject the idea that I should refrain from going for a leisure drive simply because such a drive does not cause global warming.</p>}}, author = {{Gunnemyr, Mattias}}, issn = {{1386-2820}}, keywords = {{Causal influence; Causation; Causing harm; David Lewis; Global warming; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{399--424}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Ethical Theory and Moral Practice}}, title = {{Causing Global Warming}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-09990-w}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10677-019-09990-w}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2019}}, }