Multiple pricing for personal assistance services
(2024) In Economic Modelling 141.- Abstract
- Third-party payers often reimburse health care providers based on prospectively set prices. Although a key motivation of prospective payment is to contain costs, this paper shows that this aspect crucially depends on the design of the pricing scheme due to the well-known incentives of patient selection (or “dumping”). This paper provides a general theoretical framework where heterogeneous users are served by either private for-profit or public providers, each paid an hourly compensation by a third-party payer. The private, but not the public providers may select patients. It is demonstrated that this realistic feature of the model implies that total costs depends on the number of prices. The features of the model is illustrated using the... (More)
- Third-party payers often reimburse health care providers based on prospectively set prices. Although a key motivation of prospective payment is to contain costs, this paper shows that this aspect crucially depends on the design of the pricing scheme due to the well-known incentives of patient selection (or “dumping”). This paper provides a general theoretical framework where heterogeneous users are served by either private for-profit or public providers, each paid an hourly compensation by a third-party payer. The private, but not the public providers may select patients. It is demonstrated that this realistic feature of the model implies that total costs depends on the number of prices. The features of the model is illustrated using the Swedish system of personal assistance services as a motivating example. Numerical results show that marginal adjustments to the current uniform pricing scheme would lead to substantial savings. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/def2f211-0a01-4523-9573-0ee19b36f51a
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU ; Ellegård, Lina Maria LU ; Enache, Andreea ; Erlanson, Albin and Thami, Prakriti LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- C61, D47, D78, I11, OR in health services, Personal assistance, Public and private providers, Multiple pricing, Welfare, Dumping
- in
- Economic Modelling
- volume
- 141
- article number
- 106916
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85207023009
- ISSN
- 0264-9993
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106916
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- def2f211-0a01-4523-9573-0ee19b36f51a
- date added to LUP
- 2024-10-25 14:24:51
- date last changed
- 2025-04-29 22:09:52
@article{def2f211-0a01-4523-9573-0ee19b36f51a, abstract = {{Third-party payers often reimburse health care providers based on prospectively set prices. Although a key motivation of prospective payment is to contain costs, this paper shows that this aspect crucially depends on the design of the pricing scheme due to the well-known incentives of patient selection (or “dumping”). This paper provides a general theoretical framework where heterogeneous users are served by either private for-profit or public providers, each paid an hourly compensation by a third-party payer. The private, but not the public providers may select patients. It is demonstrated that this realistic feature of the model implies that total costs depends on the number of prices. The features of the model is illustrated using the Swedish system of personal assistance services as a motivating example. Numerical results show that marginal adjustments to the current uniform pricing scheme would lead to substantial savings.}}, author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Ellegård, Lina Maria and Enache, Andreea and Erlanson, Albin and Thami, Prakriti}}, issn = {{0264-9993}}, keywords = {{C61; D47; D78; I11; OR in health services; Personal assistance; Public and private providers; Multiple pricing; Welfare; Dumping}}, language = {{eng}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, series = {{Economic Modelling}}, title = {{Multiple pricing for personal assistance services}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106916}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106916}}, volume = {{141}}, year = {{2024}}, }