Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring
(2018) In Working Papers- Abstract
- We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider sanctioning mechanisms that allow agents to commit to collective punishment in case total output fall short of a target. We find that cooperation is higher in the case of collective punishment compared to both the case of no punishment and the case of standard peer-to-peer punishment which conditions on the noisy signals. Further experiments indicate that both the commitment possibility and the collective nature of punishment matter for the positive... (More)
- We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider sanctioning mechanisms that allow agents to commit to collective punishment in case total output fall short of a target. We find that cooperation is higher in the case of collective punishment compared to both the case of no punishment and the case of standard peer-to-peer punishment which conditions on the noisy signals. Further experiments indicate that both the commitment possibility and the collective nature of punishment matter for the positive effect of collective incentives on cooperation. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/e543400e-8296-4916-9942-0fe9d760cad0
- author
- Mengel, Friederike LU ; Mohlin, Erik LU and Weidenholzer, Simon
- organization
- publishing date
- 2018
- type
- Working paper/Preprint
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Public goods game, Team production, Punishment, Collective sanctions, Imperfect monitoring, C72, D02, D23, D90
- in
- Working Papers
- issue
- 2018:11
- pages
- 33 pages
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- e543400e-8296-4916-9942-0fe9d760cad0
- date added to LUP
- 2018-05-29 16:18:10
- date last changed
- 2024-09-10 00:20:26
@misc{e543400e-8296-4916-9942-0fe9d760cad0, abstract = {{We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider sanctioning mechanisms that allow agents to commit to collective punishment in case total output fall short of a target. We find that cooperation is higher in the case of collective punishment compared to both the case of no punishment and the case of standard peer-to-peer punishment which conditions on the noisy signals. Further experiments indicate that both the commitment possibility and the collective nature of punishment matter for the positive effect of collective incentives on cooperation.}}, author = {{Mengel, Friederike and Mohlin, Erik and Weidenholzer, Simon}}, keywords = {{Public goods game; Team production; Punishment; Collective sanctions; Imperfect monitoring; C72; D02; D23; D90}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Working Paper}}, number = {{2018:11}}, series = {{Working Papers}}, title = {{Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring}}, url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/194853843/WP18_11.pdf}}, year = {{2018}}, }