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Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts : Verbal Expression in Ultimatum Games

Samahita, Margaret LU (2017) In Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 67. p.111-121
Abstract
Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental verbal expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can comment either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The potential for gossip is sufficient to induce image concerns in senders, resulting in fairer offers in the audience treatment. Consequently, despite insignificant effect on receivers’ behaviour, the possibility of verbal expression to an audience is found to increase co-operation and hence welfare. There is demand for verbal expression even when it is unobserved or not triggered by negative stimulus.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
ultimatum game, cooperation, communication, emotion, self-esteem
in
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
volume
67
pages
12 pages
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • scopus:85008168803
  • wos:000398226100012
ISSN
2214-8043
DOI
10.1016/j.socec.2016.12.003
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
e5c20dec-725a-4635-aebd-b76b2cb15438
date added to LUP
2016-12-13 08:46:12
date last changed
2018-01-07 11:40:50
@article{e5c20dec-725a-4635-aebd-b76b2cb15438,
  abstract     = {Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental verbal expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can comment either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The potential for gossip is sufficient to induce image concerns in senders, resulting in fairer offers in the audience treatment. Consequently, despite insignificant effect on receivers’ behaviour, the possibility of verbal expression to an audience is found to increase co-operation and hence welfare. There is demand for verbal expression even when it is unobserved or not triggered by negative stimulus.},
  author       = {Samahita, Margaret},
  issn         = {2214-8043},
  keyword      = {ultimatum game,cooperation,communication,emotion,self-esteem},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {111--121},
  publisher    = {Elsevier},
  series       = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
  title        = {Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts : Verbal Expression in Ultimatum Games},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2016.12.003},
  volume       = {67},
  year         = {2017},
}