Liability structure and the flight to liquidity : Evidence from swedish banks during the great depression
(2026) In Finance Research Letters 87.- Abstract
This paper investigates how bank liability regimes shaped liquidity responses during the Great Depression in Sweden. Using monthly balance sheet data (1929-1934), we find that unlimited liability banks increased liquid assets more aggressively in response to monetary tightening and crisis, reallocating away from securities. In contrast, limited liability banks exhibited weaker responses. Mechanism tests reveal higher risk tolerance and funding fragility among limited liability banks, suggesting that internal incentives and external constraints jointly explain institutional heterogeneity in crisis behavior.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/eb502d8e-ee06-40f0-83a5-a5927d147bd0
- author
- Zhao, Liang LU and Ögren, Anders LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2026-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Great depression, Limited liability bank, Liquidity ratio, Risk-taking, Unlimited liability bank
- in
- Finance Research Letters
- volume
- 87
- article number
- 109033
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:105023328891
- ISSN
- 1544-6123
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.frl.2025.109033
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- eb502d8e-ee06-40f0-83a5-a5927d147bd0
- date added to LUP
- 2026-02-11 10:11:02
- date last changed
- 2026-02-11 10:12:12
@article{eb502d8e-ee06-40f0-83a5-a5927d147bd0,
abstract = {{<p>This paper investigates how bank liability regimes shaped liquidity responses during the Great Depression in Sweden. Using monthly balance sheet data (1929-1934), we find that unlimited liability banks increased liquid assets more aggressively in response to monetary tightening and crisis, reallocating away from securities. In contrast, limited liability banks exhibited weaker responses. Mechanism tests reveal higher risk tolerance and funding fragility among limited liability banks, suggesting that internal incentives and external constraints jointly explain institutional heterogeneity in crisis behavior.</p>}},
author = {{Zhao, Liang and Ögren, Anders}},
issn = {{1544-6123}},
keywords = {{Great depression; Limited liability bank; Liquidity ratio; Risk-taking; Unlimited liability bank}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
series = {{Finance Research Letters}},
title = {{Liability structure and the flight to liquidity : Evidence from swedish banks during the great depression}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2025.109033}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.frl.2025.109033}},
volume = {{87}},
year = {{2026}},
}