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Altering the Point of You : Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Metacognition

Liljenfors, Rikard LU (2012)
Abstract
The aim of the thesis was to examine different aspects of the role of intersubjectivity in metacognitive development and in social understanding. More specifically, it investigates how different theoretical frameworks, such as mentalization theory, the theory of primary intersubjectivity, and interaction theory describe the developmental role of intersubjectivity. The suggestions these theories make in regard to this is also studied. Common to all three papers included in the dissertation is the conviction that intersubjectivity actually is central for, and affects in a basic way, social and cognitive development from the very beginning of life.

The methods employed are theoretical and concern the analysis of empirical studies in... (More)
The aim of the thesis was to examine different aspects of the role of intersubjectivity in metacognitive development and in social understanding. More specifically, it investigates how different theoretical frameworks, such as mentalization theory, the theory of primary intersubjectivity, and interaction theory describe the developmental role of intersubjectivity. The suggestions these theories make in regard to this is also studied. Common to all three papers included in the dissertation is the conviction that intersubjectivity actually is central for, and affects in a basic way, social and cognitive development from the very beginning of life.

The methods employed are theoretical and concern the analysis of empirical studies in developmental psychology, as well as the analysis of, and comparison between, theories concerning different aspects of social understanding.

In the first paper, metacognition is interpreted as a way of managing cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world-directed actions cannot reduce the distance to a particular goal, the agents involved may engage in epistemic action directed at cognition. Such actions are often physical and involve other people, and thus are open to observation. Taking a dynamic systems approach to development, it is suggested that implicit and perceptual metacognition emerges from dyadic reciprocal interaction. Early intersubjectivity allows infants to internalize and construct rudimentary strategies for monitoring and control of their own and of others’ cognitions by means of emotion and attention. The functions of initiating, maintaining and achieving turns make proto-conversation a productive platform for developing metacognition. It enables the caregiver and the infant to create shared routines for epistemic actions that permit training of metacognitive skills. The adult is of double epistemic use to the infant—as a teacher who comments on and corrects the infant’s efforts, and as a cognitive resource for the infant.

The second paper deals with the question of how primary engagement and interaction relate to social understanding, most notably mentalization. The basic hypothesis considered is that primary intersubjectivity and mentalization are complementary and that the latter depends on the former, but the converse to this is not the case. Primary intersubjectivity is the sharing of experiences. It involves emotional engagement in second-person relations that are meaningful to the infant already from the start, whereas the theory of affect mirroring provides an explanation of how mentalization and representational abilities develop from dyadic interaction and contingency detection. A comparison of the theories suggests that, despite of their differences, they can fruitfully be combined. This paves the way for developing an alternative interpretation of affect mirroring, one based on the idea of young infants’ understanding the experiential dimension of emotion and using this to understand others. This makes it possible to trace the continuous development of social understanding based on emotion experience and affect sharing, and in addition to elaborate on the role of second-person engagement in attachment.

The third paper concerns the concept of mentalization as it was introduced into psychological science by Fonagy and his associates. The study describes some fundamental aspects of how the development of mentalization is viewed within the framework of this theoretical approach, enabling certain issues that seem difficult to explain in terms of mentalization theory to be more readily understood. A critical discussion of the theory is then undertaken, comparing and contrasting it with the theory of primary intersubjectivity. A suggestion is made concerning the development of mentalization that connects it with the notion of primary intersubjectivity. More specifically, it is argued that mentalization develops originally within the context of primary intersubjectivity, and that primary intersubjectivity is a basic prerequisite for the development of mentalization and in addition that there is a partial overlap between the concepts of primary intersubjectivity and implicit mentalization. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Popular Abstract in Swedish

Syftet med denna avhandling var att undersöka olika aspekter på intersubjektivitet, metakognitiv utveckling och mellanmänsklig förståelse. Mer precist var syftet att undersöka hur några specifika teorier – mentaliseringsteorin, teorin om primär intersubjektivitet, samt interaktionsteorin – beskriver vilken roll intersubjektivitet har att spela i denna utveckling. De förslag som formuleras i dessa teorier är också föremål för närmare granskning. Gemensamt för de tre artiklar som ingår i avhandlingen är övertygelsen att intersubjektivitet är centralt för, och har väsentlig påverkan på, barnets sociala, emotionella och kognitiva utveckling.

Metoderna i avhandlingen är teoretiska och ägnas... (More)
Popular Abstract in Swedish

Syftet med denna avhandling var att undersöka olika aspekter på intersubjektivitet, metakognitiv utveckling och mellanmänsklig förståelse. Mer precist var syftet att undersöka hur några specifika teorier – mentaliseringsteorin, teorin om primär intersubjektivitet, samt interaktionsteorin – beskriver vilken roll intersubjektivitet har att spela i denna utveckling. De förslag som formuleras i dessa teorier är också föremål för närmare granskning. Gemensamt för de tre artiklar som ingår i avhandlingen är övertygelsen att intersubjektivitet är centralt för, och har väsentlig påverkan på, barnets sociala, emotionella och kognitiva utveckling.

Metoderna i avhandlingen är teoretiska och ägnas åt analys av empiriska studier i utvecklingspsykologi såväl som analys av och jämförelser mellan ovannämnda teorier.

I den första artikeln betraktas metakognition som ett sätt att ”förvalta” sina kognitiva resurser men utan att denna process förutsätter vare sig algoritmiska strategier eller metarepresentation vilket annars är gängse. Då en individs pragmatiska, utåtriktade handlingar inte hjälper individen att närma sig ett givet mål, kan individen engagera sig i så kallade ’epistemiska handlingar’ vilka ägnas åt individens kognition snarare än ett yttre mål. Epistemiska handlingar är ofta fysiska och kan även involvera andra människor vilket gör dem möjliga att observera. Genom att utgå ifrån ett dynamiskt system-perspektiv på utveckling föreslås att implicit och perceptuell metakognition härrör från dyadisk och ömsesidig interaktion då barnet är mellan 2 och 4 månaders ålder. Denna tidiga intersubjektivitet möjliggör för spädbarn att internalisera och utforma rudimentära strategier för ’övervakning’ och kontroll (två metakognitiva processer) av såväl egna som andras kognitiva processer i termer av emotion och uppmärksamhet. Med funktioner som att initiera, upprätthålla och åstadkomma ömsesidighet utgör därmed så kallad ’proto-konversation’ ett fruktbart fundament för den metakognitiva utvecklingen. Det möjliggör också för vårdnadsgivaren och barnet att utforma gemensamma rutiner för epistemisk handling i vilka metakognitiva förmågor kan övas. Den vuxna är så att säga av dubbel epistemisk nytta för barnet, dels genom att kommentera och korrigera barnets försök, dels som en kognitiv resurs för barnet.

Den andra artikeln berör frågan hur grundläggande emotionellt engagemang och interaktion relaterar till social förståelse, särskilt mentaliseringsförmågan. Den grundläggande hypotesen är att primär intersubjektivitet och mentalisering är komplementära förmågor, och att den senare beror av den förra, men inte tvärtom. Primär intersubjektivitet definieras ofta som att dela upplevelser, t ex emotioner, intentioner och uppmärksamhet. Det inkluderar emotionellt engagemang i andra-persons relationer som för barnet har en signifikant mening redan från allra första början. Teorin om affektspegling (som är inkluderad i mentaliseringsteorin) å andra sidan, innebär en förklaring av hur mentaliseringsförmågan och förmågan att (meta)representera utvecklas ur dyadisk interaktion med hjälp av barnets upptäckt att reaktioner beror av något som utlöser dem (contingency detection). En jämförelse mellan teorierna indikerar att, trots viktiga skillnader, skulle de kunna kombineras på ett fruktbart sätt. Detta gör det också möjligt att utveckla en alternativ tolkning av fenomenet affektspegling, en tolkning som baseras på idén att spädbarn inte bara upplever emotioner (vilket inte alla är överens om) utan att de dessutom kan använda sina emotionsupplevelser för att förstå andra. Det möjliggör i sin tur att man kan spåra den kontinuerliga utvecklingen av social förståelse baserat på emotionsupplevelse och delandet av affekter, och därutöver att utforska vilken roll andra-persons engagemang i anknytning spelar i sammanhanget.

Den tredje artikeln berör begreppet mentalisering så som det en gång introducerades i psykologin av Fonagy och hans medarbetare. Studien beskriver några fundamentala aspekter av hur utvecklingen av mentalisering betraktas inom detta teoretiska ramverk, vilket leder till att vissa frågor som är svårförklarade i termer av mentaliseringsteori kan förstås bättre. Teorin är sedan föremål för en kritisk diskussion där den jämförs och kontrasteras med teorin om primär intersubjektivitet. Ett förslag läggs fram angående utvecklingen av mentaliseringsförmågan där den länkas samman med primär intersubjektivitet. Mer specifikt så hävdas det i artikeln att förmågan att mentalisera utvecklas initialt i kontexten av primär intersubjektivitet, och att primär intersubjektivitet är en grundläggande förutsättning för att mentaliseringsförmågan alls ska kunna utvecklas samt att begreppen primär intersubjektivitet och implicit mentalisering överlappar. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
supervisor
opponent
  • Associate Professor Emeritus Vedeler, Dankert, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
organization
publishing date
type
Thesis
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Social Understanding, Mentalization, Primary Intersubjectivity, Metacognitive Development, Theoretical Psychology.
pages
185 pages
publisher
Department of Psychology, Lund University
defense location
Kulturens Auditorium, Tegnérsplatsen, Lund
defense date
2012-12-21 10:00:00
ISBN
978-91-628-7765-1
language
English
LU publication?
yes
additional info
The attached document in full text does not contain the full dissertation. The three separate articles are not included. Please see p. 8 in the attached document for DOI of the article that is already published.
id
1d1cbf18-3150-4acf-98e3-fbd8de4de99d (old id 3165940)
date added to LUP
2016-04-04 10:05:24
date last changed
2021-04-09 17:53:49
@phdthesis{1d1cbf18-3150-4acf-98e3-fbd8de4de99d,
  abstract     = {{The aim of the thesis was to examine different aspects of the role of intersubjectivity in metacognitive development and in social understanding. More specifically, it investigates how different theoretical frameworks, such as mentalization theory, the theory of primary intersubjectivity, and interaction theory describe the developmental role of intersubjectivity. The suggestions these theories make in regard to this is also studied. Common to all three papers included in the dissertation is the conviction that intersubjectivity actually is central for, and affects in a basic way, social and cognitive development from the very beginning of life.<br/><br>
The methods employed are theoretical and concern the analysis of empirical studies in developmental psychology, as well as the analysis of, and comparison between, theories concerning different aspects of social understanding.<br/><br>
In the first paper, metacognition is interpreted as a way of managing cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world-directed actions cannot reduce the distance to a particular goal, the agents involved may engage in epistemic action directed at cognition. Such actions are often physical and involve other people, and thus are open to observation. Taking a dynamic systems approach to development, it is suggested that implicit and perceptual metacognition emerges from dyadic reciprocal interaction. Early intersubjectivity allows infants to internalize and construct rudimentary strategies for monitoring and control of their own and of others’ cognitions by means of emotion and attention. The functions of initiating, maintaining and achieving turns make proto-conversation a productive platform for developing metacognition. It enables the caregiver and the infant to create shared routines for epistemic actions that permit training of metacognitive skills. The adult is of double epistemic use to the infant—as a teacher who comments on and corrects the infant’s efforts, and as a cognitive resource for the infant.<br/><br>
The second paper deals with the question of how primary engagement and interaction relate to social understanding, most notably mentalization. The basic hypothesis considered is that primary intersubjectivity and mentalization are complementary and that the latter depends on the former, but the converse to this is not the case. Primary intersubjectivity is the sharing of experiences. It involves emotional engagement in second-person relations that are meaningful to the infant already from the start, whereas the theory of affect mirroring provides an explanation of how mentalization and representational abilities develop from dyadic interaction and contingency detection. A comparison of the theories suggests that, despite of their differences, they can fruitfully be combined. This paves the way for developing an alternative interpretation of affect mirroring, one based on the idea of young infants’ understanding the experiential dimension of emotion and using this to understand others. This makes it possible to trace the continuous development of social understanding based on emotion experience and affect sharing, and in addition to elaborate on the role of second-person engagement in attachment.<br/><br>
The third paper concerns the concept of mentalization as it was introduced into psychological science by Fonagy and his associates. The study describes some fundamental aspects of how the development of mentalization is viewed within the framework of this theoretical approach, enabling certain issues that seem difficult to explain in terms of mentalization theory to be more readily understood. A critical discussion of the theory is then undertaken, comparing and contrasting it with the theory of primary intersubjectivity. A suggestion is made concerning the development of mentalization that connects it with the notion of primary intersubjectivity. More specifically, it is argued that mentalization develops originally within the context of primary intersubjectivity, and that primary intersubjectivity is a basic prerequisite for the development of mentalization and in addition that there is a partial overlap between the concepts of primary intersubjectivity and implicit mentalization.}},
  author       = {{Liljenfors, Rikard}},
  isbn         = {{978-91-628-7765-1}},
  keywords     = {{Social Understanding; Mentalization; Primary Intersubjectivity; Metacognitive Development; Theoretical Psychology.}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  publisher    = {{Department of Psychology, Lund University}},
  school       = {{Lund University}},
  title        = {{Altering the Point of You : Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Metacognition}},
  url          = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/5458141/3165941.pdf}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}