The Law of the Limit to Land Productivity and China’s
(2014) In Rural China 11(1). p.46-87- Abstract
- Using a new concept—the law of the limit to land productivity—this article builds a three
(physical, economic, and institutional) worlds’ land-use model with inverse logics of different
development stages in a time perspective: before, in, and after the population trap. This model
extends the span of the Malthusian population model to history after the Industrial Revolution
and makes static property rights theory dynamic. It argues that 1) cost/return ratios decide the
effects of land rights; 2) changes in cost/return ratios alter the effects of land rights; and 3) changes
in land/labor ratios first alter cost/return ratios and then patterns of land rights. Using this
model and... (More) - Using a new concept—the law of the limit to land productivity—this article builds a three
(physical, economic, and institutional) worlds’ land-use model with inverse logics of different
development stages in a time perspective: before, in, and after the population trap. This model
extends the span of the Malthusian population model to history after the Industrial Revolution
and makes static property rights theory dynamic. It argues that 1) cost/return ratios decide the
effects of land rights; 2) changes in cost/return ratios alter the effects of land rights; and 3) changes
in land/labor ratios first alter cost/return ratios and then patterns of land rights. Using this
model and statistical data, the article, from the supply side, explores the validity of the concept
of China’s “hidden agricultural revolution” advanced by Philip C. C. Huang, and simultaneously
tests the model’s inverse logics and dynamic land rights theory. The result is that Douglass North’s
property rights theory has reversed the causality of things: although the state can set the property
regime, it cannot control what kind of effects will flow from the regime it chooses. Hence the state
should select property regimes according to their real effects rather than the effects subjectively
derived from North’s “theory.” (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4362707
- author
- Pei, Xiaolin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2014
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- law of the limit to land productivity, Malthusian population model, static property rights theory, dynamic land rights theory, China’s “hidden agricultural revolution”
- in
- Rural China
- volume
- 11
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 46 - 87
- publisher
- Brill
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85058444083
- ISSN
- 2213-6738
- DOI
- 10.1163/22136746-12341249
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- bd0f8d2d-ff30-4781-ab19-5ac9f3a3eba5 (old id 4362707)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:32:30
- date last changed
- 2022-01-28 01:08:30
@article{bd0f8d2d-ff30-4781-ab19-5ac9f3a3eba5,
abstract = {{Using a new concept—the law of the limit to land productivity—this article builds a three<br/><br>
(physical, economic, and institutional) worlds’ land-use model with inverse logics of different<br/><br>
development stages in a time perspective: before, in, and after the population trap. This model<br/><br>
extends the span of the Malthusian population model to history after the Industrial Revolution<br/><br>
and makes static property rights theory dynamic. It argues that 1) cost/return ratios decide the<br/><br>
effects of land rights; 2) changes in cost/return ratios alter the effects of land rights; and 3) changes<br/><br>
in land/labor ratios first alter cost/return ratios and then patterns of land rights. Using this<br/><br>
model and statistical data, the article, from the supply side, explores the validity of the concept<br/><br>
of China’s “hidden agricultural revolution” advanced by Philip C. C. Huang, and simultaneously<br/><br>
tests the model’s inverse logics and dynamic land rights theory. The result is that Douglass North’s<br/><br>
property rights theory has reversed the causality of things: although the state can set the property<br/><br>
regime, it cannot control what kind of effects will flow from the regime it chooses. Hence the state<br/><br>
should select property regimes according to their real effects rather than the effects subjectively<br/><br>
derived from North’s “theory.”}},
author = {{Pei, Xiaolin}},
issn = {{2213-6738}},
keywords = {{law of the limit to land productivity; Malthusian population model; static property rights theory; dynamic land rights theory; China’s “hidden agricultural revolution”}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{46--87}},
publisher = {{Brill}},
series = {{Rural China}},
title = {{The Law of the Limit to Land Productivity and China’s}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341249}},
doi = {{10.1163/22136746-12341249}},
volume = {{11}},
year = {{2014}},
}