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Exit as governance : do blockholders affect corporate innovation in large US firms?

Helling, Axel R. ; Maury, Benjamin and Liljeblom, Eva LU (2020) In Accounting and Finance 60(2). p.1703-1725
Abstract

Using a sample of large US firms, this study shows that blockholders in combination with liquidity can contribute positively to innovation (R&D investments). We contribute to the literature on managerial myopia that has focused mainly on large owners and their type (short-term/long-term). Our results are in line with recent theoretical studies arguing that blockholders in combination with market liquidity can mitigate managerial myopia, as suggested by the exit model of governance. The results indicate that blockholders can be efficient in resolving agency problems and that they can enhance long-term prosperity, even when the individual blockholder investment horizon may not be long.

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Blockholders, Innovation, Liquidity, Myopia, Ownership, R&D
in
Accounting and Finance
volume
60
issue
2
pages
23 pages
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • scopus:85068638983
ISSN
0810-5391
DOI
10.1111/acfi.12509
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
78a898c4-aa4a-4b5a-9449-64ece2a08e59
date added to LUP
2019-07-24 13:41:51
date last changed
2022-04-26 03:15:36
@article{78a898c4-aa4a-4b5a-9449-64ece2a08e59,
  abstract     = {{<p>Using a sample of large US firms, this study shows that blockholders in combination with liquidity can contribute positively to innovation (R&amp;D investments). We contribute to the literature on managerial myopia that has focused mainly on large owners and their type (short-term/long-term). Our results are in line with recent theoretical studies arguing that blockholders in combination with market liquidity can mitigate managerial myopia, as suggested by the exit model of governance. The results indicate that blockholders can be efficient in resolving agency problems and that they can enhance long-term prosperity, even when the individual blockholder investment horizon may not be long.</p>}},
  author       = {{Helling, Axel R. and Maury, Benjamin and Liljeblom, Eva}},
  issn         = {{0810-5391}},
  keywords     = {{Blockholders; Innovation; Liquidity; Myopia; Ownership; R&D}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{1703--1725}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  series       = {{Accounting and Finance}},
  title        = {{Exit as governance : do blockholders affect corporate innovation in large US firms?}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12509}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/acfi.12509}},
  volume       = {{60}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}