Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents
Brinck, Ingar LU
and Gärdenfors, Peter
LU
(1999)
In Synthese
118(1).
p.89-104
- Abstract
- Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have fullblown intentionality, the agent should... (More)
- Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have fullblown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/833468
- author
- Brinck, Ingar
LU
and Gärdenfors, Peter
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 1999
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Synthese
- volume
- 118
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 89 - 104
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:0242380057
- ISSN
- 0039-7857
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 7ef3f74a-3392-4233-bdf1-27670ba65064 (old id 833468)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 16:11:27
- date last changed
- 2022-01-28 17:55:33
@article{7ef3f74a-3392-4233-bdf1-27670ba65064,
abstract = {{Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have fullblown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context.}},
author = {{Brinck, Ingar and Gärdenfors, Peter}},
issn = {{0039-7857}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{89--104}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Synthese}},
title = {{Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents}},
volume = {{118}},
year = {{1999}},
}