Strategic Voting under Coalition Governments
(2016) In Lund Political Studies- Abstract
- If a voter defects from preference under the consideration of policy outcomes and others' behavior, it is a "strategic vote". This thesis relates voters' strategic considerations to the government formation process: the chances for a party to gain seats, enter office, and affect overall policies. This implies that voters sometimes think like parties on the governmental consequences of the vote. From these goals, four different types of strategic voting are discussed: voting for a party that is more likely to get elected (not to "waste one's vote"), more likely to lead the government formation process ("strategic sequencing"), at risk of falling below an electoral threshold ("insurance-voting"), or to affect the overall policies of a... (More)
- If a voter defects from preference under the consideration of policy outcomes and others' behavior, it is a "strategic vote". This thesis relates voters' strategic considerations to the government formation process: the chances for a party to gain seats, enter office, and affect overall policies. This implies that voters sometimes think like parties on the governmental consequences of the vote. From these goals, four different types of strategic voting are discussed: voting for a party that is more likely to get elected (not to "waste one's vote"), more likely to lead the government formation process ("strategic sequencing"), at risk of falling below an electoral threshold ("insurance-voting"), or to affect the overall policies of a coalition ("compensational voting"). The focus is strategic voting for smaller parties, which has been given less attention in previous studies and is more likely to take place in proportional representation (PR), where the government is usually a coalition. The argument being made is that the potentially strategic voter does not always cast (the same type of) strategic vote. Information found in polls, for example, varies from election to election. Indications from the parties regarding with whom they intend to cooperate should also affect consideration about parties' post-electoral behavior. The ideas concerning strategic voting under coalition governments in practice are tested in four empirical studies. Using different methods, from large scale real life election studies over time to small scale laboratory experiments, the findings support the idea that different types of coalition-oriented strategic voting occurs and that these different types are based on the election-specific context. (Less)
- Abstract (Swedish)
- När en väljare röstar med andras beteende i åtanke och politikutfall i sikte är det en "strategisk" röst. Den här studien relaterar väljares strategiska överväganden till olika steg i regeringsbildningsprocessen: att ta plats i parlamentet, ingå i regering, och påverka politikutfallet. Detta innebär att väljaren ibland tänker som ett parti på vad rösten kan få för konsekvenser. Utifrån detta perspektiv diskuteras fyra olika typer av strategisk röstning som kan äga rum: viljan rösta på ett parti som säkert tar plats i parlamentet (för att undvika att "kasta bort" sin röst), har chans att leda regeringsbildningsprocessen ("sekvensröstning"), riskerar hamna under spärren ("tröskelröstning"), eller behöver stärkas i en regeringskoalition för... (More)
- När en väljare röstar med andras beteende i åtanke och politikutfall i sikte är det en "strategisk" röst. Den här studien relaterar väljares strategiska överväganden till olika steg i regeringsbildningsprocessen: att ta plats i parlamentet, ingå i regering, och påverka politikutfallet. Detta innebär att väljaren ibland tänker som ett parti på vad rösten kan få för konsekvenser. Utifrån detta perspektiv diskuteras fyra olika typer av strategisk röstning som kan äga rum: viljan rösta på ett parti som säkert tar plats i parlamentet (för att undvika att "kasta bort" sin röst), har chans att leda regeringsbildningsprocessen ("sekvensröstning"), riskerar hamna under spärren ("tröskelröstning"), eller behöver stärkas i en regeringskoalition för att politiken ska utformas i viss riktning ("kompensatorisk röstning"). Till skillnad från de flesta tidigare studier av strategisk röstning, är huvudfokus röstning på mindre partier, vilket är relevant för proportionella valsystem där regeringen ofta är koalitioner. Argumentet som förs fram är att den potentiellt strategiske väljaren inte alltid röstar (strategiskt) på samma sätt. Information som signalerar hur andra ska agera, till exempel signaler från partierna om vilka de avser samarbeta med (så kallade för-elektorala koalitioner) och opinionsmätningar, antas påverka. Idéerna om väljares strategiska resonemang testas i praktiken i fyra studier, som använder olika typer av metoder, från omfattande enkätdatastudier till experiment i laboratorium. Studierna bekräftar idén att olika typer av strategisk röstning förkommer, och att den valspecifika kontexten påverkar hur väljare röstar strategiskt. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8516297
- author
- Fredén, Annika LU
- supervisor
-
- Hanna Bäck LU
- Jan Teorell LU
- opponent
-
- Associate Professor Indridason, Indridi, University of California, Riverside
- organization
- publishing date
- 2016
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- strategic, voting, coalitions, proportional representation
- in
- Lund Political Studies
- issue
- 176
- pages
- 160 pages
- publisher
- Lund University
- defense location
- Edens hörsal, Paradisgatan 5 H, Lund
- defense date
- 2016-02-05 10:00:00
- ISSN
- 0460-0037
- ISBN
- 978-91-7623-587-4
- 978-91-7623-588-1
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- b1736437-ae30-48d5-82dc-38aa4aaf4cf9 (old id 8516297)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 09:23:12
- date last changed
- 2021-12-02 09:14:47
@phdthesis{b1736437-ae30-48d5-82dc-38aa4aaf4cf9,
abstract = {{If a voter defects from preference under the consideration of policy outcomes and others' behavior, it is a "strategic vote". This thesis relates voters' strategic considerations to the government formation process: the chances for a party to gain seats, enter office, and affect overall policies. This implies that voters sometimes think like parties on the governmental consequences of the vote. From these goals, four different types of strategic voting are discussed: voting for a party that is more likely to get elected (not to "waste one's vote"), more likely to lead the government formation process ("strategic sequencing"), at risk of falling below an electoral threshold ("insurance-voting"), or to affect the overall policies of a coalition ("compensational voting"). The focus is strategic voting for smaller parties, which has been given less attention in previous studies and is more likely to take place in proportional representation (PR), where the government is usually a coalition. The argument being made is that the potentially strategic voter does not always cast (the same type of) strategic vote. Information found in polls, for example, varies from election to election. Indications from the parties regarding with whom they intend to cooperate should also affect consideration about parties' post-electoral behavior. The ideas concerning strategic voting under coalition governments in practice are tested in four empirical studies. Using different methods, from large scale real life election studies over time to small scale laboratory experiments, the findings support the idea that different types of coalition-oriented strategic voting occurs and that these different types are based on the election-specific context.}},
author = {{Fredén, Annika}},
isbn = {{978-91-7623-587-4}},
issn = {{0460-0037}},
keywords = {{strategic; voting; coalitions; proportional representation}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{176}},
publisher = {{Lund University}},
school = {{Lund University}},
series = {{Lund Political Studies}},
title = {{Strategic Voting under Coalition Governments}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/5310456/8520346.pdf}},
year = {{2016}},
}