Accounting for Context : Separating Monetary and (Uncertain) Social Incentives
(2018) In Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 72. p.61-66- Abstract
- This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a way that explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects and allows for uncertainty also about the latter. Moreover, it allows non-economic cost associated with the deviation from some norm to be more discriminatory than just “right” or “wrong.” We refer to existing evidence on dictator game giving to demonstrate how intermediate behaviours (giving some) as well as payments to change the context (e.g. exiting the game) can be accounted for. Furthermore, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results... (More)
- This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a way that explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects and allows for uncertainty also about the latter. Moreover, it allows non-economic cost associated with the deviation from some norm to be more discriminatory than just “right” or “wrong.” We refer to existing evidence on dictator game giving to demonstrate how intermediate behaviours (giving some) as well as payments to change the context (e.g. exiting the game) can be accounted for. Furthermore, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results of a classroom experiment suggest that women are more responsive to such contextual effects. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8c180bcc-49ff-4957-8e54-cdb651f07582
- author
- Bergh, Andreas LU and Wichardt, Philipp C. LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2018
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- social norms, experimental economics, game theory, context effects, efficiency, social preferences, utility, D03, D63, Z10
- in
- Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- volume
- 72
- pages
- 61 - 66
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85037027565
- ISSN
- 2214-8043
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.socec.2017.11.002
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 8c180bcc-49ff-4957-8e54-cdb651f07582
- date added to LUP
- 2017-11-13 21:07:48
- date last changed
- 2022-03-24 22:20:57
@article{8c180bcc-49ff-4957-8e54-cdb651f07582,
abstract = {{This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a way that explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects and allows for uncertainty also about the latter. Moreover, it allows non-economic cost associated with the deviation from some norm to be more discriminatory than just “right” or “wrong.” We refer to existing evidence on dictator game giving to demonstrate how intermediate behaviours (giving some) as well as payments to change the context (e.g. exiting the game) can be accounted for. Furthermore, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results of a classroom experiment suggest that women are more responsive to such contextual effects.}},
author = {{Bergh, Andreas and Wichardt, Philipp C.}},
issn = {{2214-8043}},
keywords = {{social norms; experimental economics; game theory; context effects; efficiency; social preferences; utility; D03; D63; Z10}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{61--66}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
series = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}},
title = {{Accounting for Context : Separating Monetary and (Uncertain) Social Incentives}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/34764209/BeingLiked_JEBE_15R2.pdf}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.socec.2017.11.002}},
volume = {{72}},
year = {{2018}},
}