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Motivational Internalism

(2015)
Abstract
Motivational internalism - the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation - is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptions of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of... (More)
Motivational internalism - the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation - is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptions of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as problems for non-cognitivists.



This volume's thirteen new essays and introduction are meant to help readers appreciate state-of-the-art of research on internalism, to identify connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen discussion of a number of central aspects of metaethics. The introductory chapter provides a structured overview of the debate with a focus on the last two decades, while the book's three main sections focus on what evidence there is for or against various versions of internalism, the relevance of versions of internalism for wider metaethical issues, and different ways of accommodating both internalist and externalist aspects of moral practice, respectively. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
organization
publishing date
type
Book/Report
publication status
published
subject
keywords
metaethics, internalism, externalism, moral psychology
editor
Björnsson, Gunnar; Strandberg, Caj LU ; Francén Olinder, Ragnar; Eriksson, John and Björklund, Fredrik LU
pages
320 pages
publisher
Oxford University Press
ISBN
978-0-19-936795-5
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
f3ede952-53d1-4864-a42d-d84c80d55f2f (old id 5271456)
alternative location
http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199367955.do
date added to LUP
2015-04-10 12:39:32
date last changed
2016-04-16 07:38:19
@misc{f3ede952-53d1-4864-a42d-d84c80d55f2f,
  abstract     = {Motivational internalism - the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation - is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptions of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as problems for non-cognitivists.<br/><br>
<br/><br>
This volume's thirteen new essays and introduction are meant to help readers appreciate state-of-the-art of research on internalism, to identify connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen discussion of a number of central aspects of metaethics. The introductory chapter provides a structured overview of the debate with a focus on the last two decades, while the book's three main sections focus on what evidence there is for or against various versions of internalism, the relevance of versions of internalism for wider metaethical issues, and different ways of accommodating both internalist and externalist aspects of moral practice, respectively.},
  editor       = {Björnsson, Gunnar and Strandberg, Caj and Francén Olinder, Ragnar and Eriksson, John and Björklund, Fredrik},
  isbn         = {978-0-19-936795-5},
  keyword      = {metaethics,internalism,externalism,moral psychology},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {320},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0xa809178)},
  title        = {Motivational Internalism},
  year         = {2015},
}