Advanced

Essays on Auctions

Rander, Robin LU (2007) In Lund Economic Series 145.
Abstract
The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapter, the case of a procurement

situation where multiple producers compete in price and quality, but are unable to commit to quality, is treated in a scoring

auction context. An optimal scoring rule, for a buyer able to comittto a rule, is characterised. The second chapter is concerned

with auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric in the sense that one bidder may receive a fraction of the seller's profit. The

issue of existence of equilibria under such circumstances is considered. It turns out there are in general no equilibria in

continuous, strictly increasing strategies. The final... (More)
The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapter, the case of a procurement

situation where multiple producers compete in price and quality, but are unable to commit to quality, is treated in a scoring

auction context. An optimal scoring rule, for a buyer able to comittto a rule, is characterised. The second chapter is concerned

with auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric in the sense that one bidder may receive a fraction of the seller's profit. The

issue of existence of equilibria under such circumstances is considered. It turns out there are in general no equilibria in

continuous, strictly increasing strategies. The final chapter considers competition between privately held and state-owned

businesses in the German auction for third-generation (3G) mobile telecommunications. A theoretical model is developed. The

only equilibria of this model consistent with observed behaviour are equilibria where ownership does nor affect the outcome of

the auction. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
supervisor
opponent
  • Professor Wolfstetter, Elmar, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie
organization
publishing date
type
Thesis
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Auctions, Bidding, Bayesian equilibrium, Procurement, Game theory
in
Lund Economic Series
volume
145
pages
110 pages
publisher
Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy
defense location
Holger Crafoords Ekonomicentrum, EC3:210
defense date
2008-01-11 14:15
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
27d03c39-9617-4e3f-a4b2-0e4040b325e7 (old id 750754)
date added to LUP
2007-12-17 13:30:51
date last changed
2016-09-19 08:45:04
@misc{27d03c39-9617-4e3f-a4b2-0e4040b325e7,
  abstract     = {The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapter, the case of a procurement <br/><br>
situation where multiple producers compete in price and quality, but are unable to commit to quality, is treated in a scoring <br/><br>
auction context. An optimal scoring rule, for a buyer able to comittto a rule, is characterised. The second chapter is concerned <br/><br>
with auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric in the sense that one bidder may receive a fraction of the seller's profit. The <br/><br>
issue of existence of equilibria under such circumstances is considered. It turns out there are in general no equilibria in <br/><br>
continuous, strictly increasing strategies. The final chapter considers competition between privately held and state-owned <br/><br>
businesses in the German auction for third-generation (3G) mobile telecommunications. A theoretical model is developed. The <br/><br>
only equilibria of this model consistent with observed behaviour are equilibria where ownership does nor affect the outcome of <br/><br>
the auction.},
  author       = {Rander, Robin},
  keyword      = {Auctions,Bidding,Bayesian equilibrium,Procurement,Game theory},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {110},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x96ddb30)},
  series       = {Lund Economic Series},
  title        = {Essays on Auctions},
  volume       = {145},
  year         = {2007},
}