Career incentives in political hierarchy: evidence from Imperial Russia
(2020) In European Review of Economic History 24(2). p.264-287- Abstract
- This paper studies political career incentives in a nondemocratic historical setting to assess early political institutions. We construct a novel panel database of governors of Imperial Russia in 91 provinces between 1895 and 1914. Measuring an imperial governor’s performance by his ability of peacekeeping, we test whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career incentives to improve the performance of provincial governors. We find that the central administration promoted better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main ones (gubernias). In addition, we show that political connections had no significant effect on career prospects.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/0a65fe0b-37e3-49bf-8f3b-4075962e7183
- author
- Gokmen, Gunes LU and Kofanov, Dmitrii
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- European Review of Economic History
- volume
- 24
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 24 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85087428341
- ISSN
- 1474-0044
- DOI
- 10.1093/ereh/hey033
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 0a65fe0b-37e3-49bf-8f3b-4075962e7183
- date added to LUP
- 2019-02-22 16:35:37
- date last changed
- 2022-04-25 21:42:21
@article{0a65fe0b-37e3-49bf-8f3b-4075962e7183, abstract = {{This paper studies political career incentives in a nondemocratic historical setting to assess early political institutions. We construct a novel panel database of governors of Imperial Russia in 91 provinces between 1895 and 1914. Measuring an imperial governor’s performance by his ability of peacekeeping, we test whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career incentives to improve the performance of provincial governors. We find that the central administration promoted better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main ones (gubernias). In addition, we show that political connections had no significant effect on career prospects.}}, author = {{Gokmen, Gunes and Kofanov, Dmitrii}}, issn = {{1474-0044}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{264--287}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}, series = {{European Review of Economic History}}, title = {{Career incentives in political hierarchy: evidence from Imperial Russia}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ereh/hey033}}, doi = {{10.1093/ereh/hey033}}, volume = {{24}}, year = {{2020}}, }