Essays in Strategy-proof Social Choice Theory
(2010)- Abstract
- This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness”, generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the... (More)
- This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness”, generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives. The second paper, “Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods” (coauthored with Lars-Gunnar Svensson), considers a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set of finite categories and characterizes the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over , namely for the three cases when voters’ preferences over are additive, completely separable respectively weakly separable. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1714330
- author
- Reffgen, Alexander LU
- supervisor
- organization
- publishing date
- 2010
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- pages
- 58 pages
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 3246766b-995b-4221-9b9c-43db6c956f15 (old id 1714330)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 13:45:56
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 21:16:08
@misc{3246766b-995b-4221-9b9c-43db6c956f15,
abstract = {{This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness”, generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives. The second paper, “Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods” (coauthored with Lars-Gunnar Svensson), considers a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set of finite categories and characterizes the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over , namely for the three cases when voters’ preferences over are additive, completely separable respectively weakly separable.}},
author = {{Reffgen, Alexander}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Licentiate Thesis}},
title = {{Essays in Strategy-proof Social Choice Theory}},
year = {{2010}},
}