Dream Experience - Phenomenology meets Cognitive Neuroscience
(2002)- Abstract
- This treatise examines what I call the ‘traditional view’ on the phenomenology of dreaming. According to this view, dreams are experienced in more or less the same way as waking reality – that is, our experience of “being-in-the-dream” is very much like our experience of “being-in-the-world”. The traditional view will be examined from three different standpoints: phenomenology, cognitive science and neuroscience. It will be shown that the traditional view generates a number of problems. These problems have to do with dream delusion (the fact that the dreamer typically does not seem to have any insight into the fact that he is dreaming), dream narration (the fact that dream experience often seems narratively ordered, conveying a unitary... (More)
- This treatise examines what I call the ‘traditional view’ on the phenomenology of dreaming. According to this view, dreams are experienced in more or less the same way as waking reality – that is, our experience of “being-in-the-dream” is very much like our experience of “being-in-the-world”. The traditional view will be examined from three different standpoints: phenomenology, cognitive science and neuroscience. It will be shown that the traditional view generates a number of problems. These problems have to do with dream delusion (the fact that the dreamer typically does not seem to have any insight into the fact that he is dreaming), dream narration (the fact that dream experience often seems narratively ordered, conveying a unitary “world” consisting of meaningful objects), dream agency (the fact that the dreamer seems to be able to interact with the illusory objects in his dream), and dream symbolism (the fact that dreams sometimes seem to have a “deeper”, symbolic meaning). A large portion of this treatise will be devoted to the solution of these problems in the form of speculative accounts based on theory and data coming from cognitive science and neuroscience. (Less)
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Popular Abstract in Swedish
Vi tänker oss i allmänhet att vår upplevelse av drömmen är lik vår upplevelse av vår vakna verklighet i så måtto att drömmen presenterar sig som en värld som vi som drömmare tar för verklig och som vi på olika sätt interagerar med. I denna avhandling tittar jag närmare på denna uppfattning och granskar hur väl den harmonierar med vad vi nu anser oss veta om hur hjärnan/psyket fungerar under sömn och vaka. Jag försöker visa att vår vardagliga uppfattning om drömmar skapar en rad teoretiska problem. Ett sådant problem rör hur drömmen kan upplevas som en av oss oberoende värld samtidigt som det är vi själva som skapar den. Ett annat problem rör det faktum att vi i drömmen synes acceptera händelser... (More) - Popular Abstract in Swedish
Vi tänker oss i allmänhet att vår upplevelse av drömmen är lik vår upplevelse av vår vakna verklighet i så måtto att drömmen presenterar sig som en värld som vi som drömmare tar för verklig och som vi på olika sätt interagerar med. I denna avhandling tittar jag närmare på denna uppfattning och granskar hur väl den harmonierar med vad vi nu anser oss veta om hur hjärnan/psyket fungerar under sömn och vaka. Jag försöker visa att vår vardagliga uppfattning om drömmar skapar en rad teoretiska problem. Ett sådant problem rör hur drömmen kan upplevas som en av oss oberoende värld samtidigt som det är vi själva som skapar den. Ett annat problem rör det faktum att vi i drömmen synes acceptera händelser som normala som vi i vakenlivet skulle funnit ytterst bisarra. Dessa och andra problem finner i avhandlingen sin preliminära lösning (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/20497
- author
- Karlsson, Lennart LU
- supervisor
- opponent
-
- Revonsuo, Antti, University of Turku
- organization
- publishing date
- 2002
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Philosophical logic, dream symbolism, neuroscience, delusional states, visual awareness, lucid dreaming, Phenomenology, dreaming, Teoretisk filosofi, logik
- pages
- 202 pages
- publisher
- Lennart Karlsson, Dept. of Philosophy, Lund University,
- defense location
- Kungshuset
- defense date
- 2002-01-29 10:15:00
- ISBN
- 91-628-5090-3
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 97b38be6-381f-45da-b5db-ec739eab3beb (old id 20497)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 12:02:14
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 21:08:38
@phdthesis{97b38be6-381f-45da-b5db-ec739eab3beb,
abstract = {{This treatise examines what I call the ‘traditional view’ on the phenomenology of dreaming. According to this view, dreams are experienced in more or less the same way as waking reality – that is, our experience of “being-in-the-dream” is very much like our experience of “being-in-the-world”. The traditional view will be examined from three different standpoints: phenomenology, cognitive science and neuroscience. It will be shown that the traditional view generates a number of problems. These problems have to do with dream delusion (the fact that the dreamer typically does not seem to have any insight into the fact that he is dreaming), dream narration (the fact that dream experience often seems narratively ordered, conveying a unitary “world” consisting of meaningful objects), dream agency (the fact that the dreamer seems to be able to interact with the illusory objects in his dream), and dream symbolism (the fact that dreams sometimes seem to have a “deeper”, symbolic meaning). A large portion of this treatise will be devoted to the solution of these problems in the form of speculative accounts based on theory and data coming from cognitive science and neuroscience.}},
author = {{Karlsson, Lennart}},
isbn = {{91-628-5090-3}},
keywords = {{Philosophical logic; dream symbolism; neuroscience; delusional states; visual awareness; lucid dreaming; Phenomenology; dreaming; Teoretisk filosofi; logik}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Lennart Karlsson, Dept. of Philosophy, Lund University,}},
school = {{Lund University}},
title = {{Dream Experience - Phenomenology meets Cognitive Neuroscience}},
year = {{2002}},
}