How can we be moral when we are so irrational?
(2013) In Logique et Analyse p.101-126- Abstract
- Normative ethics usually presupposes background accounts of human agency, and although different ethical theorists might have different pictures of human agency in mind, there is still something like a standard account that most of mainstream normative ethics can be understood to rest on. Ethical theorists tend to have Rational Man, or at least some close relative to him, in mind when constructing normative theories. It will be argued here that empirical fndings raise doubts about the accuracy of this kind of account; human beings fall too far short of ideals of rationality for it to be meaningful to devise normative ideals within such a framework. Instead, it is suggested, normative ethics could be conducted more proftably if the idea of... (More)
- Normative ethics usually presupposes background accounts of human agency, and although different ethical theorists might have different pictures of human agency in mind, there is still something like a standard account that most of mainstream normative ethics can be understood to rest on. Ethical theorists tend to have Rational Man, or at least some close relative to him, in mind when constructing normative theories. It will be argued here that empirical fndings raise doubts about the accuracy of this kind of account; human beings fall too far short of ideals of rationality for it to be meaningful to devise normative ideals within such a framework. Instead, it is suggested, normative ethics could be conducted more proftably if the idea of unifying all ethical concerns into one theoretical account is abandoned. Such a disunity of ethical theorizing would then match the disunited and heuristic-oriented nature of our agency. Some preliminary suggestions about what ethical theorizing might look like instead are provided here along with some remarks about how these relate to other approaches in the literature. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4215955
- author
- Sahlin, Nils-Eric LU and Brännmark, Johan LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2013
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- moral, irrationality
- in
- Logique et Analyse
- issue
- 221
- pages
- 101 - 126
- publisher
- Centre national belge de recherche de logique
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000326254000007
- scopus:84876193019
- ISSN
- 0024-5836
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- ddff61ca-d476-4212-8ac0-573509e42c99 (old id 4215955)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:10:18
- date last changed
- 2022-03-21 22:33:34
@article{ddff61ca-d476-4212-8ac0-573509e42c99,
abstract = {{Normative ethics usually presupposes background accounts of human agency, and although different ethical theorists might have different pictures of human agency in mind, there is still something like a standard account that most of mainstream normative ethics can be understood to rest on. Ethical theorists tend to have Rational Man, or at least some close relative to him, in mind when constructing normative theories. It will be argued here that empirical fndings raise doubts about the accuracy of this kind of account; human beings fall too far short of ideals of rationality for it to be meaningful to devise normative ideals within such a framework. Instead, it is suggested, normative ethics could be conducted more proftably if the idea of unifying all ethical concerns into one theoretical account is abandoned. Such a disunity of ethical theorizing would then match the disunited and heuristic-oriented nature of our agency. Some preliminary suggestions about what ethical theorizing might look like instead are provided here along with some remarks about how these relate to other approaches in the literature.}},
author = {{Sahlin, Nils-Eric and Brännmark, Johan}},
issn = {{0024-5836}},
keywords = {{moral; irrationality}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{221}},
pages = {{101--126}},
publisher = {{Centre national belge de recherche de logique}},
series = {{Logique et Analyse}},
title = {{How can we be moral when we are so irrational?}},
year = {{2013}},
}