Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms
Lo Presti, Patrizio LU
(2014)
In Logos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology
5(4).
p.445-464
- Abstract
- Abstract in Undetermined
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one
doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is
normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is
suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought
not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I
argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we
have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because
violating norms.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4856284
- author
- Lo Presti, Patrizio
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2014
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Logos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology
- volume
- 5
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 445 - 464
- publisher
- Gheorghe Zane Institute for Economic and Social Research, Romanian Academy, Iasi Branch
- ISSN
- 2069-0533
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 61218548-c2de-4300-b683-7efe14fde9c5 (old id 4856284)
- alternative location
- http://logos-and-episteme.acadiasi.ro/volume-v-issue-4-december-2014/
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 09:29:59
- date last changed
- 2021-03-29 22:18:13
@article{61218548-c2de-4300-b683-7efe14fde9c5,
abstract = {{Abstract in Undetermined<br/>Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one<br/>doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is<br/>normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is<br/>suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought<br/>not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I<br/>argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we<br/>have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because<br/>violating norms.}},
author = {{Lo Presti, Patrizio}},
issn = {{2069-0533}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{445--464}},
publisher = {{Gheorghe Zane Institute for Economic and Social Research, Romanian Academy, Iasi Branch}},
series = {{Logos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology}},
title = {{Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/5340940/4940928.pdf}},
volume = {{5}},
year = {{2014}},
}