Moral Sense and Virtue in Hume’s Ethics
(2006) In Mind Association occasional series p.158-170- Abstract
- On the face of it, Hume’s understanding of the relationship between virtue and moral sense seems clear enough. According to Hume, a virtue is a quality of mind or character trait that produces approval, and vice a quality of mind that produces blame ( T 614; cp. 473,575). This relationship between virtue and vice and our moral sentiments is described and analysed by Hume as part of his wider and more general account of the mechanism of the indirect passions. Any quality or object, Hume maintains, that is closely related to a person and that produces either pleasure or pain will give rise to an indirect passion. In the case of pride and humility the quality or object must be closely related to myself, whereas in the case of love and hate... (More)
- On the face of it, Hume’s understanding of the relationship between virtue and moral sense seems clear enough. According to Hume, a virtue is a quality of mind or character trait that produces approval, and vice a quality of mind that produces blame ( T 614; cp. 473,575). This relationship between virtue and vice and our moral sentiments is described and analysed by Hume as part of his wider and more general account of the mechanism of the indirect passions. Any quality or object, Hume maintains, that is closely related to a person and that produces either pleasure or pain will give rise to an indirect passion. In the case of pride and humility the quality or object must be closely related to myself, whereas in the case of love and hate the quality or object must belong or be related to some other person. When the quality or object is pleasant we shall feel either pride or love, when it is painful I feel either humility or hate. (Less)
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- author
- Russell, Paul LU
- publishing date
- 2006
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- sentiments, mechanism, quality, moral, approval
- host publication
- Values and Virtues : Aristotelianism and Contemporary Ethics - Aristotelianism and Contemporary Ethics
- series title
- Mind Association occasional series
- editor
- Chappell, Timothy
- pages
- 158 - 170
- publisher
- Clarendon Press
- ISSN
- 0955-9892
- ISBN
- 9780199291458
- 9781383043822
- DOI
- 10.1093/oso/9780199291458.003.0009
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 50ceb493-7852-4fad-b229-c8d49d782f89
- date added to LUP
- 2024-09-14 08:39:32
- date last changed
- 2024-10-03 14:38:55
@inbook{50ceb493-7852-4fad-b229-c8d49d782f89, abstract = {{On the face of it, Hume’s understanding of the relationship between virtue and moral sense seems clear enough. According to Hume, a virtue is a quality of mind or character trait that produces approval, and vice a quality of mind that produces blame ( T 614; cp. 473,575). This relationship between virtue and vice and our moral sentiments is described and analysed by Hume as part of his wider and more general account of the mechanism of the indirect passions. Any quality or object, Hume maintains, that is closely related to a person and that produces either pleasure or pain will give rise to an indirect passion. In the case of pride and humility the quality or object must be closely related to myself, whereas in the case of love and hate the quality or object must belong or be related to some other person. When the quality or object is pleasant we shall feel either pride or love, when it is painful I feel either humility or hate.}}, author = {{Russell, Paul}}, booktitle = {{Values and Virtues : Aristotelianism and Contemporary Ethics}}, editor = {{Chappell, Timothy}}, isbn = {{9780199291458}}, issn = {{0955-9892}}, keywords = {{sentiments; mechanism; quality; moral; approval}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{158--170}}, publisher = {{Clarendon Press}}, series = {{Mind Association occasional series}}, title = {{Moral Sense and Virtue in Hume’s Ethics}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199291458.003.0009}}, doi = {{10.1093/oso/9780199291458.003.0009}}, year = {{2006}}, }