Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions
(2018) In Games and Economic Behavior 107. p.41-59- Abstract
- This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets... (More)
- This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/818164b5-bcf6-42d0-94d6-91525188d236
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2018
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- rationing price equilibrium, (extended) english price sequences, iterative English auction rule, C78, D44, D45
- in
- Games and Economic Behavior
- volume
- 107
- pages
- 19 pages
- publisher
- 0899-8256
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85034630340
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.027
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 818164b5-bcf6-42d0-94d6-91525188d236
- date added to LUP
- 2017-11-13 10:45:49
- date last changed
- 2022-03-24 22:20:56
@article{818164b5-bcf6-42d0-94d6-91525188d236, abstract = {{This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.}}, author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar}}, issn = {{0899-8256}}, keywords = {{rationing price equilibrium; (extended) english price sequences; iterative English auction rule; C78; D44; D45}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{41--59}}, publisher = {{0899-8256}}, series = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, title = {{Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.027}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.027}}, volume = {{107}}, year = {{2018}}, }