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On the malleability of fairness ideals : Spillover effects in partial and impartial allocation tasks

Dengler-Roscher, Kathrin ; Montinari, Natalia LU ; Panganiban, Marian ; Ploner, Matteo and Werner, Benedikt (2018) In Journal of Economic Psychology 65. p.60-74
Abstract

How malleable are people's fairness ideals? Although fairness is an oft-invoked concept in allocation situations, it is still unclear whether and to what extent people's allocations reflect their fairness ideals. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether people's fairness ideals are sensitive to spillover effects associated with the specific order of allocation tasks. Participants first generate resources in a real-effort task and then distribute them. In the partial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for herself and another participant. In the impartial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for two other participants. We also manipulate the participants’ experience, i.e., whether they... (More)

How malleable are people's fairness ideals? Although fairness is an oft-invoked concept in allocation situations, it is still unclear whether and to what extent people's allocations reflect their fairness ideals. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether people's fairness ideals are sensitive to spillover effects associated with the specific order of allocation tasks. Participants first generate resources in a real-effort task and then distribute them. In the partial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for herself and another participant. In the impartial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for two other participants. We also manipulate the participants’ experience, i.e., whether they took part in similar allocation experiments before. We find that participants are more likely to allocate more resources to themselves than what they earned in the real-effort task when they decide partially. Exclusively for inexperienced participants, deciding impartially first dampens selfish behavior when they decide partially.

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author
; ; ; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Dictator, Fairness, Impartial spectators, Partial stakeholders, Proportionality principle
in
Journal of Economic Psychology
volume
65
pages
15 pages
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • scopus:85044147562
ISSN
0167-4870
DOI
10.1016/j.joep.2017.11.001
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
8857a1ce-daaf-46e5-b2e1-e80fc77fa3d5
date added to LUP
2018-04-03 14:01:17
date last changed
2022-04-25 06:37:27
@article{8857a1ce-daaf-46e5-b2e1-e80fc77fa3d5,
  abstract     = {{<p>How malleable are people's fairness ideals? Although fairness is an oft-invoked concept in allocation situations, it is still unclear whether and to what extent people's allocations reflect their fairness ideals. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether people's fairness ideals are sensitive to spillover effects associated with the specific order of allocation tasks. Participants first generate resources in a real-effort task and then distribute them. In the partial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for herself and another participant. In the impartial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for two other participants. We also manipulate the participants’ experience, i.e., whether they took part in similar allocation experiments before. We find that participants are more likely to allocate more resources to themselves than what they earned in the real-effort task when they decide partially. Exclusively for inexperienced participants, deciding impartially first dampens selfish behavior when they decide partially.</p>}},
  author       = {{Dengler-Roscher, Kathrin and Montinari, Natalia and Panganiban, Marian and Ploner, Matteo and Werner, Benedikt}},
  issn         = {{0167-4870}},
  keywords     = {{Dictator; Fairness; Impartial spectators; Partial stakeholders; Proportionality principle}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{04}},
  pages        = {{60--74}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier}},
  series       = {{Journal of Economic Psychology}},
  title        = {{On the malleability of fairness ideals : Spillover effects in partial and impartial allocation tasks}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2017.11.001}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.joep.2017.11.001}},
  volume       = {{65}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}