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Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings

Björklund, Fredrik LU orcid (2004) In LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.
Abstract
Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Book/Report
publication status
published
subject
in
LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.
pages
15 pages
publisher
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
report number
2004:1
ISSN
1404-3718
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
afd54f5d-da93-42eb-843c-80d3bae1f4eb (old id 936073)
date added to LUP
2016-04-01 15:48:28
date last changed
2018-11-21 20:36:31
@techreport{afd54f5d-da93-42eb-843c-80d3bae1f4eb,
  abstract     = {{Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.}},
  author       = {{Björklund, Fredrik}},
  institution  = {{Department of Philosophy, Lund University}},
  issn         = {{1404-3718}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{2004:1}},
  series       = {{LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.}},
  title        = {{Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings}},
  year         = {{2004}},
}