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Georgian Orthodox Church: Whither the foreign policy role?

Metreveli, Tornike LU (2018) In Civil Georgia
Abstract
Liberal minority of the Georgian population views the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) as an obstacle to country’s progress. Overwhelming majority of GOC’s influential clerics are (fairly) seen as resistant to the idea(l)s of equality between sexes and gender, individual liberties and generally to critical thinking. The majority of Georgians considers GOC as the most trusted institution, making patriarch Ilia the most trusted man in Georgia.

The issue of identity: “Georgianness” as the religious hierarchs and conservative politicians like to call it, has been central for the GOC’s political operation. In most cases, this has been directed against minorities.

The three largest (by estimated number of participants) protests... (More)
Liberal minority of the Georgian population views the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) as an obstacle to country’s progress. Overwhelming majority of GOC’s influential clerics are (fairly) seen as resistant to the idea(l)s of equality between sexes and gender, individual liberties and generally to critical thinking. The majority of Georgians considers GOC as the most trusted institution, making patriarch Ilia the most trusted man in Georgia.

The issue of identity: “Georgianness” as the religious hierarchs and conservative politicians like to call it, has been central for the GOC’s political operation. In most cases, this has been directed against minorities.

The three largest (by estimated number of participants) protests led and organized by GOC during the last 10 years from Russian invasion were held against the Law on Registration of Religious Minority Organizations (2011), the Law on Self-governance (2013) and against sexual liberty: a violent action against LGBTI activists on May 17, 2013.
If GOC indeed cares about the loss of Georgian identity, we may pose question why does its establishment interpret religious, gender or sexual liberties as more threatening to “Georgianness” than Russia’s occupation, as well as the ongoing borderization policy under which Georgia lost 151 settlements (135 in Tskhinvali region and 16 in Kodori Valley) since the end of the 2008 war?
This begs a central question: can GOC ally with the state in pursuing the national security agenda? And given the issues it widely protested against until today, would it? (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
publishing date
type
Contribution to specialist publication or newspaper
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Georgian Orthodox Church, Eastern Christianity, religion and state
categories
Popular Science
in
Civil Georgia
language
English
LU publication?
no
id
ae517118-2aeb-429d-8ddf-1fb77da7d558
alternative location
https://civil.ge/archives/247434
date added to LUP
2021-01-12 11:07:24
date last changed
2021-03-09 12:35:56
@article{ae517118-2aeb-429d-8ddf-1fb77da7d558,
  abstract     = {{Liberal minority of the Georgian population views the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) as an obstacle to country’s progress. Overwhelming majority of GOC’s influential clerics are (fairly) seen as resistant to the idea(l)s of equality between sexes and gender, individual liberties and generally to critical thinking. The majority of Georgians considers GOC as the most trusted institution, making patriarch Ilia the most trusted man in Georgia.<br/><br/>The issue of identity: “Georgianness” as the religious hierarchs and conservative politicians like to call it, has been central for the GOC’s political operation. In most cases, this has been directed against minorities.<br/><br/>The three largest (by estimated number of participants) protests led and organized by GOC during the last 10 years from Russian invasion were held against the Law on Registration of Religious Minority Organizations (2011), the Law on Self-governance (2013) and against sexual liberty: a violent action against LGBTI activists on May 17, 2013.<br/>If GOC indeed cares about the loss of Georgian identity, we may pose question why does its establishment interpret religious, gender or sexual liberties as more threatening to “Georgianness” than Russia’s occupation, as well as the ongoing borderization policy under which Georgia lost 151 settlements (135 in Tskhinvali region and 16 in Kodori Valley) since the end of the 2008 war?<br/>This begs a central question: can GOC ally with the state in pursuing the national security agenda? And given the issues it widely protested against until today, would it?}},
  author       = {{Metreveli, Tornike}},
  keywords     = {{Georgian Orthodox Church; Eastern Christianity; religion and state}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{07}},
  series       = {{Civil Georgia}},
  title        = {{Georgian Orthodox Church: Whither the foreign policy role?}},
  url          = {{https://civil.ge/archives/247434}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}