Minimizing Side-Channel Attack Vulnerability Via Schedule Randomization
(2019) p.2928-2933- Abstract
- Control systems can be vulnerable to security threats where an attacker gathers information about the execution of the system. In particular, side-channel attacks exploit the predictability of real-time control systems and of their schedules. To counteract their action, a scheduler can randomize the temporal execution of tasks and limit the amount of information the attacker can gather. Schedule randomization is aimed at achieving the highest possible schedule diversity (measured using the upper-approximated entropy metric) during the real-time execution of the controller. This paper investigates fundamental limitations of schedule randomization for a generic taskset. The constructed schedule set has minimal size and achieves the highest... (More)
- Control systems can be vulnerable to security threats where an attacker gathers information about the execution of the system. In particular, side-channel attacks exploit the predictability of real-time control systems and of their schedules. To counteract their action, a scheduler can randomize the temporal execution of tasks and limit the amount of information the attacker can gather. Schedule randomization is aimed at achieving the highest possible schedule diversity (measured using the upper-approximated entropy metric) during the real-time execution of the controller. This paper investigates fundamental limitations of schedule randomization for a generic taskset. The constructed schedule set has minimal size and achieves the highest possible upper-approximated entropy. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/ea063306-653a-4a9d-bf80-f6f3343e0f4d
- author
- Vreman, Nils LU ; Pates, Richard LU ; Krueger, Kristin ; Fohler, Gerhard and Maggio, Martina LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019-12
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- 2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
- pages
- 6 pages
- publisher
- IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85082473875
- ISBN
- 978-1-7281-1399-9
- 978-1-7281-1398-2
- DOI
- 10.1109/CDC40024.2019.9030144
- project
- ELLIIT LU P02: Co-Design of Robust and Secure Networked Embedded Control Systems
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- ea063306-653a-4a9d-bf80-f6f3343e0f4d
- date added to LUP
- 2020-01-23 13:58:47
- date last changed
- 2024-07-10 09:33:23
@inproceedings{ea063306-653a-4a9d-bf80-f6f3343e0f4d, abstract = {{Control systems can be vulnerable to security threats where an attacker gathers information about the execution of the system. In particular, side-channel attacks exploit the predictability of real-time control systems and of their schedules. To counteract their action, a scheduler can randomize the temporal execution of tasks and limit the amount of information the attacker can gather. Schedule randomization is aimed at achieving the highest possible schedule diversity (measured using the upper-approximated entropy metric) during the real-time execution of the controller. This paper investigates fundamental limitations of schedule randomization for a generic taskset. The constructed schedule set has minimal size and achieves the highest possible upper-approximated entropy.}}, author = {{Vreman, Nils and Pates, Richard and Krueger, Kristin and Fohler, Gerhard and Maggio, Martina}}, booktitle = {{2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)}}, isbn = {{978-1-7281-1399-9}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{2928--2933}}, publisher = {{IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.}}, title = {{Minimizing Side-Channel Attack Vulnerability Via Schedule Randomization}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC40024.2019.9030144}}, doi = {{10.1109/CDC40024.2019.9030144}}, year = {{2019}}, }