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Career incentives in political hierarchy: evidence from Imperial Russia

Gokmen, Gunes LU and Kofanov, Dmitrii (2020) In European Review of Economic History 24(2). p.264-287
Abstract
This paper studies political career incentives in a nondemocratic historical setting to assess early political institutions. We construct a novel panel database of governors of Imperial Russia in 91 provinces between 1895 and 1914. Measuring an imperial governor’s performance by his ability of peacekeeping, we test whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career incentives to improve the performance of provincial governors. We find that the central administration promoted better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main ones (gubernias). In addition, we show that political connections had no significant effect on career prospects.
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author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
European Review of Economic History
volume
24
issue
2
pages
24 pages
publisher
Oxford University Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:85087428341
ISSN
1474-0044
DOI
10.1093/ereh/hey033
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
0a65fe0b-37e3-49bf-8f3b-4075962e7183
date added to LUP
2019-02-22 16:35:37
date last changed
2020-07-22 03:47:05
@article{0a65fe0b-37e3-49bf-8f3b-4075962e7183,
  abstract     = {This paper studies political career incentives in a nondemocratic historical setting to assess early political institutions. We construct a novel panel database of governors of Imperial Russia in 91 provinces between 1895 and 1914. Measuring an imperial governor’s performance by his ability of peacekeeping, we test whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career incentives to improve the performance of provincial governors. We find that the central administration promoted better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main ones (gubernias). In addition, we show that political connections had no significant effect on career prospects.},
  author       = {Gokmen, Gunes and Kofanov, Dmitrii},
  issn         = {1474-0044},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {264--287},
  publisher    = {Oxford University Press},
  series       = {European Review of Economic History},
  title        = {Career incentives in political hierarchy: evidence from Imperial Russia},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ereh/hey033},
  doi          = {10.1093/ereh/hey033},
  volume       = {24},
  year         = {2020},
}