Essays in Strategyproof Social Choice Theory
(2010) Abstract
 This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategyproof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multivaluedness”, generalizes the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every nondictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the... (More)
 This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategyproof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multivaluedness”, generalizes the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every nondictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives. The second paper, “Strategyproof voting for multiple public goods” (coauthored with LarsGunnar Svensson), considers a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set of finite categories and characterizes the set of all strategyproof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over , namely for the three cases when voters’ preferences over are additive, completely separable respectively weakly separable. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1714330
 author
 Reffgen, Alexander ^{LU}
 supervisor

 LarsGunnar Svensson ^{LU}
 organization
 publishing date
 2010
 type
 Thesis
 publication status
 published
 subject
 pages
 58 pages
 language
 English
 LU publication?
 yes
 id
 3246766b995b42219b9c43db6c956f15 (old id 1714330)
 date added to LUP
 20101116 14:00:33
 date last changed
 20160919 08:45:17
@misc{3246766b995b42219b9c43db6c956f15, abstract = {This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategyproof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multivaluedness”, generalizes the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every nondictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives. The second paper, “Strategyproof voting for multiple public goods” (coauthored with LarsGunnar Svensson), considers a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set of finite categories and characterizes the set of all strategyproof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over , namely for the three cases when voters’ preferences over are additive, completely separable respectively weakly separable.}, author = {Reffgen, Alexander}, language = {eng}, note = {Licentiate Thesis}, pages = {58}, title = {Essays in Strategyproof Social Choice Theory}, year = {2010}, }