The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection
(2020) In Erkenntnis 87. p.2219-2242- Abstract
- Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division... (More)
- Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/18748915-f1e9-41e3-8579-72bcb19377e4
- author
- Stephens, Andreas LU and Tjöstheim, Trond Arild LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020-09-12
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Naturalistic epistemology, Hilary Kornblith, Reflection
- in
- Erkenntnis
- volume
- 87
- pages
- 2219 - 2242
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85090860457
- ISSN
- 1572-8420
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10670-020-00299-0
- project
- Cognitive Epistemology
- Cognitive Philosophy Research Group (CogPhi)
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 18748915-f1e9-41e3-8579-72bcb19377e4
- date added to LUP
- 2020-09-13 10:41:20
- date last changed
- 2024-03-20 15:33:59
@article{18748915-f1e9-41e3-8579-72bcb19377e4, abstract = {{Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.}}, author = {{Stephens, Andreas and Tjöstheim, Trond Arild}}, issn = {{1572-8420}}, keywords = {{Naturalistic epistemology; Hilary Kornblith; Reflection}}, language = {{eng}}, month = {{09}}, pages = {{2219--2242}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Erkenntnis}}, title = {{The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00299-0}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10670-020-00299-0}}, volume = {{87}}, year = {{2020}}, }