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The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection

Stephens, Andreas LU orcid and Tjöstheim, Trond Arild LU (2020) In Erkenntnis 87. p.2219-2242
Abstract
Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division... (More)
Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option. (Less)
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author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Naturalistic epistemology, Hilary Kornblith, Reflection
in
Erkenntnis
volume
87
pages
2219 - 2242
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:85090860457
ISSN
1572-8420
DOI
10.1007/s10670-020-00299-0
project
Cognitive Epistemology
Cognitive Philosophy Research Group (CogPhi)
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
18748915-f1e9-41e3-8579-72bcb19377e4
date added to LUP
2020-09-13 10:41:20
date last changed
2024-03-20 15:33:59
@article{18748915-f1e9-41e3-8579-72bcb19377e4,
  abstract     = {{Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.}},
  author       = {{Stephens, Andreas and Tjöstheim, Trond Arild}},
  issn         = {{1572-8420}},
  keywords     = {{Naturalistic epistemology; Hilary Kornblith; Reflection}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{09}},
  pages        = {{2219--2242}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  series       = {{Erkenntnis}},
  title        = {{The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00299-0}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10670-020-00299-0}},
  volume       = {{87}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}